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ABSTRACT 
This master’s thesis focuses on changes in income inequality in OECD countries 
and how this has changed depending on public indebtedness and economic 
performance. Increase in public debt levels has happened simultaneously with 
the increase in income inequality since 1980’s. However, the theoretical and 
empirical models related to these issues have shown remarkable divergence in 
results. This thesis analyses disposable income and market inequality Gini 
coefficients in OECD countries and it is related to domestic and external 
indeptedness of public sector and growth. 
 
This thesis provides evidence that domestic and external debt have dissimilar 
effects to income inequality with public finance from external debt improving 
equality although plausible harmful for economic growth. Increasing 
indebtedness has thus been associated with lower disposable income inequality 
although market inequality has grown. These results indicate the complicated 
way that domestic and external debt relates to economic behaviour.  
 
Introduction to the subject is provided in chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides 
background and broader history to economic inequality. Chapter 3 discusses 
differences between income and wealth inequality. Chapter 4 deals with 
historical development of inequality. Chapter 5 provides theories regarding 
inequality. Chapter 6 is similar but regarding public debt. Chapter 7 deals with 
previously done research and hypotheses. And in chapter 8 a regression analysis 
is used to analyze the effect of public debt to income inequality and their 
combined effect on economic performance. Final chapter summarizes 
conclusions and provides further research ideas. 
 
KEYWORDS: public debt, economic performance, domestic debt, 
external debt, income inequality, Gini coefficient 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Economic inequality has recently gained widespread attention. The World 
Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report for 2018 starts with “Inequality and 
unfairness”1 while just some years ago the executive summary in the same 
report said that the reason to worry was: “...high level of debt in advanced 
economies.”2. It seems that there can only be one area of focus at any given 
moment. After financial crisis it was public debt, especially in Europe, and now 
it is inequality.  
 
That singular focus on one economic topic until next one arrives has always 
been strange in my mind. It is as if these issues are not interlinked, and could be 
studied completely separately. This thesis tries to highlight some of the links 
between economic inequality and public debt, and how they ultimately may 
affect given country’s economic performance.  
 
Most, but luckily not all, research on these topics have also focused on one or 
the other, however a child can count the number of studies focusing on both of 
those issues.  Piketty’s magnum opus Capital in the twenty-first century 
(Piketty, 2014) was probably the book that helped spiral the current focus on 
economic inequality. The current interest rates for Greece’s 10 year bonds are 
now below the rates required from United States. Has the world forgotten 
completely Greece’s history regarding is debt obligations? Or is the current level 
of economic inequality in United States the reason for this? 
 
Theories regarding how inequality is affected by indeptedness and economic 
growth are still being debated. History knows no place where absolute equality 
ruled, while too much of inequality gives worry to Ray Dalio (Fleming, 2017). I 
                                                   
1 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf 
2http://reports.weforum.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/mp/uploads/pages/files/global-risks-2011.pdf 
3 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/our-biggest-economic-social-political-issue-two-economies-ray-dalio/ 
4 https://twitter.com/JeffDSachs/status/816271990382325760 
2http://reports.weforum.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/mp/uploads/pages/files/global-risks-2011.pdf 
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also take solace from the fact that Gillian Tett, who warned FT Lex readers 
about the upcoming financial crisis before it happened, has started to worry 
about the relationship between inequality and public debt (Tett, 2018).  
 
 
1.1. Objective of the study 
 
Main purpose of this study is to review existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on inequality and its history and provide new empirical evidence on 
some of its determinants related to public debt and economic performance. The 
scope of this thesis is limited to OECD-countries between years 1980 and 2015. 
Some of the current OECD-members were left out of scope due to lack of data, 
or comparability issues. (Mexico is after all quite different from average OECD-
member).  
 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
Introduction to the subject is provided in chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides 
background and broader history to economic inequality. Chapter 3 discusses 
differences between income and wealth inequality. Chapter 4 deals with 
historical development of inequality. Chapter 5 provides theories regarding 
inequality. Chapter 6 is similar but regarding public debt. Chapter 7 deals with 
previously done research and hypotheses. And in chapter 8 a regression analysis 
is used to analyze the effect of public debt to income inequality and their 
combined effect on economic performance. Final chapter summarizes 
conclusions and provides further research ideas. 
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2. Historical overview on economic inequality 
 
 
“…and growing inequality and lack of upward mobility that has jeopardized 
middle-class America’s basic bargain that if you work hard, you have a chance 
to get ahead. I believe this is the defining challenge of our time.” – Barack 
Obama, 2013 
 
Economic inequality used to be a marginal subfield within economics, but 
during the last fifteen years it has gained prominence. This was not always so. 
The question of distribution was on the most important ones in economics in 
the end of 19th century and beginning of 20th century. Now that is has gained 
more focus the level of knowledge has grown. Too much economic inequality is 
bad for society. This is contemporary consensus view. But that consensus is 
severely limited as most questions within the topic are still debated around the 
globe. Questions such as how much economic inequality matters? Or why does 
it matter? Or even the most basic question of what economic inequality even 
means? And even if it mattered, how do you measure it? Is income or wealth 
inequality worse? Or could it be a symptom of even grander problem? Economic 
inequality is used today to explain various political events and while global 
inequality as measured by Gini index is decreasing, inequality within nations is 
increasing. (Milanovic, 2016: 125).  Recently the billionaire founder of 
Bridgewater Associates, Ray Dalio, pointed out that inequality is our biggest 
economic, social and political issue3, there might be a grain of truth involved. 
He is also one of the few, along with Janet Yellen (Fleming, 2017) who are 
worried, as this thesis writer is, about the relationship between inequality and 
public debt and their current trends. (Tett, 2018). 
 
But before we venture forth I believe it is beneficial to go through what various 
thinkers have written about the topic. This is done in order to highlight that 
economic inequality is not only an economic question, but also a human 
                                                   
3 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/our-biggest-economic-social-political-issue-two-economies-ray-dalio/ 
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question. While homo economicus might not be interested (anymore) in the 
question of distribution most of homo sapiens are. This separation of views is in 
itself a major problem in economics. With these forewords I will take the reader 
through a brief history of thinking about economic inequality. 
 
 
2.1. Philosophical background of economic inequality 
 
“Economics needs a big dose of Aristotle” – Jeffrey Sacks4 
 
Current levels of inequality are not something new. Philosophers through the 
ages have pondered this issue. In the end of 19th century this question was one 
of the most important ones, not only in economics, but also in other spheres of 
life as well. Sometimes history can teach us a lesson, and therefore in the next 5 
pages there is a brief summary of some of the most important philosophers 
regarding economic inequality. 
 
 
2.1.1. Plato & Aristotles 
 
“Factional conflict is always the result of inequality…“ – Aristotle, Politics. 
 
Classical Greek philosophers did not discuss economic inequality per se, but 
Plato touched the topic in The Republic. Plato (1951) wrote that different 
economic interests lead to development of different factions, which then might 
cause instability to the ideal city-state. Plato also believed that poverty causes 
revolutions. Aristotle (1995) is in general agreement with the idea that too much 
of poverty may cause revolutions. Aristotle was also strong believer in the 
balancing middle element “…or to seek to increase the strength of the middle or 
intervening element. Such a policy will prevent the factional disputes which 
arise from inequality.” (Ibid: 203). Aristotles strongly believed that the 
                                                   
4 https://twitter.com/JeffDSachs/status/816271990382325760 
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factional conflict whether between the rich (oligarchs) and the poor or between 
oligarchs themselves was driven by inequality. As manifested in Aristotles 
words: “Factional conflict is always the result of inequality…It is the passion 
for equality which is thus at the root of faction.” (Ibid: 180). Thus he believed in 
the equality as if equality was removed that would then result either in tyranny 
or to the violent revolution and confiscation of the property from the rich. (Ibid: 
234). Equality and numerous middle citizens acted as the balancing power that 
kept the city-state in balance between Scylla and Charybdis as Aristotles 
thought this middle to be free of faction. It must be noted that Aristotles 
understood inequality mostly in political terms, but he also understood that this 
political inequality would result in economic inequality: “The most important 
rule of all, in all types of constitution, is that provision should be made – not 
only by law, but also by general system of economy – to prevent the officials 
from being able to use their office for their own gain.” (Ibid: 203-204).  While 
many contemporary thinkers might find Aristotles writing inadequate, it is 
indeed remarkable that much of what he wrote two and half millennia ago has 
influenced our thinking about economic inequality still today. And his insights 
into causes of revolution also ring true, as Alesina and Perotti found in their 
study: “As a result, mass violence and illegal seizures of power are more likely 
the more unequal the distribution of income is.” (Alesina & Perotti, 1994: 362, 
Hobbes would agree, 1902: 59). 
 
 
2.1.2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau  
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings about inequality are some of the most 
chronicled of all philosophers regarding this topic. He wrote heavily about the 
subject in Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men 
and also touched the subject in The Social Contract. This makes summarizing 
his view easier, as he did not only write about the subject implicitly but 
explicitly. It is good to remember that he did not write about economic 
inequality per se, but about inequality in more general terms. However he 
clearly understood how wealth especially affected inequality as manifested in: 
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“different privileges some enjoy to the prejudice of others, such as being 
wealthier…” (Rousseau, 1997: 131). 
 
Rousseau distinguishes two different types of inequality: natural and moral 
inequality. Of these natural inequality is caused by factors such as age and 
health and moral inequality by factors such as wealth, power or whether 
individual is honored or not (Neuhouser 2013: 194). It is good to remember that 
most if not all things that were natural were in Rousseau’s view not only 
justified, but natural state was the utopia, even if reaching that would always 
stay impossible. So in other words natural inequalities were justified and 
therefore nothing to ponder on, but moral inequalities were based on 
convention and human consent, even if they were not explicitly agreed upon, 
and thus required closer scrutiny. This is due to the fact that Rousseau did 
believe some of the moral inequalities could be justified in so far as they were 
grounded in nature (Neuhouser, 2013: 195). In the end his view can be 
summarized as that equality is necessary only because freedom cannot exist 
without it. Therefore inequality of wealth is undesired only for the reason that 
they limit freedom for others. "It is, therefore, one of the most important tasks 
of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes” (Neuhouser, 2013: 
199). 
 
 
2.1.3. Adam Smith 
 
Adam Smith is commonly known as the “father of economics” (Rasmussen, 
2016: 342) but before his opus magnum An inquiry into the Nature and causes 
of the Wealth of the Nations he was known for his contemporaries as moral 
philosopher who had published The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. So 
what was Smith’s view on economic inequality? Many argue that Smith’s main 
concern was not economic inequality per se, but alleviation of poverty. Indeed 
one of his main arguments for commercial society is its capacity to provide for 
the poor as manifested in this passage from The Wealth of the Nations “they 
who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a 
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share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, 
clothed, and lodged.” (Smith, 1981: I.viii.36, 96.) But is this all there is on 
economic inequality? 
 
Rasmussen argues in his recent paper that Smith did indeed argue against 
economic inequality, but this argument is not commonly heard in the 
contemporary discussion about ill effects of economic inequality but is rather 
different. Smith’s main concern about economic inequality was that it distorts 
our sympathies and thus leads us to not only ignore the blight of the poor, but 
this very distortion leads us to admire the rich, which undermines both morality 
and common happiness. (Rasmussen 2016: 342-343. In Rasmussen’s view 
Smith argued that too much of economic inequality would distort our 
sympathies. As in unequal societies rich would not need to act admirably to earn 
the esteem and approval of others as their wealth itself would make them 
admirable to others. Even their vices and follies would to be imitated by the vain 
men thus distorting our morality. “Thus, it is precisely the presence of extreme 
economic inequality, and the distortion of our sympathies that attends it, that 
allows—perhaps even encourages—the rich to spurn the most basic standards 
of moral conduct. If they were nearer to the rest of society in terms of wealth 
and hence status, their incentives would be quite different.” (Ibid: 349). One 
only needs to remember the current US president Donald Trump saying during 
a campaign rally: “I could shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose any voters” to 
see how this argument might be onto something. (Guardian, The, 2016).  
  
Even as Smith was concerned about economic inequality for its distortion 
effects he would be against eliminating inequality in the distribution of income. 
It can even be argued that the Smith in Wealth of the Nations is different as to 
the Smith found in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Wealth of the Nations 
one of the central arguments for defense of commercial society is its capacity to 
provide for the poor and the welfare of the poor is uttermost issue.  Whereas in 
Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith can be found arguing for the maintenance of 
“…order of society is of more importance than even the relief of the miserable.” 
(Smith 1969: 226).  
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Smith also argued that economic growth would increase humanity and good will 
and thus allow morality and virtue to thrive in the society. (Baum, 1992: 148). 
This argument goes much in line with Benjamin Friedman’s book The Moral 
Consequences of Economic Growth where his main argument can be summed 
up as “Broadly distributed economic growth creates the private attitudes and 
public institutions that foster, not undermine, a society’s moral qualities.” 
(Friedman, 2005: 435).  Or even that as economic growth fosters nations 
humanity and morals it is indeed morally right to seek policies that drive 
economic growth. (Ibid: 78). Both Friedman and Smith argue how morality of 
the society and economic growth are indeed interlinked and progress hand in 
hand.  
 
It must be stated that this view of Smith’s writing is not universal, indeed many 
argue that Smith was unmoved by inequality as his main focus was welfare of 
the poor and indeed some level of inequality would be inevitable result of 
flourishing commercial society. See for example (Hont & Ignatief, 1983: 1-4). 
We can however see that Smith’s view into inequality is not as simplistic or one-
sided as is commonly understood and his view into this issue somewhat 
changed between Wealth of the Nations and the Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
 
 
2.1.4. Karl Marx 
 
Karl Marx is today mostly forgotten in economics. His ideas however affected 
billions of people around the globe (whether they affected them negatively or 
not is a topic for another discussion which I will not touch here). For Marx the 
very idea of equality was just another bourgeois tool for class oppression (Wood, 
2014: 2). For him the idea of equality under capitalist mode of production was 
beyond absurd as manifested in “To clamor for equal or even equitable 
remuneration on the basis of the wages system is the same as to clamor for 
freedom on the basis of the slavery system.”  (CW 20: 129). In his view the 
concept and relations of what is just or right arise out of economic ones, not the 
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other way around. And even if it was the other way around, we would not be 
able to know in Marx’s view what kind of equality is needed, especially if we aim 
to equalize along one dimension as this might cause crave inequalities along 
other dimensions. (Wood, 2014: 8).  
It is therefore possible to see how in Marx’s view equality was useless goal. In 
bourgeois societies equality along rights and justice can be understood only in 
the specifically political identity. And this is wholly inadequate to the true 
human aspiration of a membership in a free community. (Wood, 2014: 10-11).  
 
For Marx the real desire for equality is about the abolition of classes. Class is 
when certain people share common interests and act to defend them. “Separate 
individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle 
against another class” (CW 5:77). In this view the very existence of classes 
causes struggle between classes. In other words, in class society irreconcilably 
interests between individuals exist. But what happens if classes are abolished? 
For this Marx offers little answers. In his view the future (of classless society) is 
by necessity largely opaque to us. (Wood, 2014: 12).  
 
To summarize Marx’s view of inequality can be simplified as following. Marx 
was affected by the inequality of this era. But trying to find a remedy for one 
dimension of inequality would cause other inequalities (and selecting one above 
others was in the first place impossible) and the whole concept of equality was 
just another bourgeois tool for class oppression as the true goal was classes 
society, of which he offers little answers, as Stalin was bound to realize (New 
Yorker, 2017), and it can be argued that it did not even interest him. Perhaps it 
would have been as: “From each according to his abilities, to each according to 
his needs!” (CW 24: 86-87). Which by definition is not equal condition.  
 
 
2.1.5. John Rawls  
 
Unlike previous philosophers mentioned here John Rawls focused on justice, 
and his most important work A Theory of Justice deals directly with 
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inequalities. His view can be summarized as following. There are two principles 
in theory of justice. The greatest equal liberty principle is the first one: “Each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others” (Rawls, 1972: 60). While the latter one has two 
components in it: “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) 
attached to attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.” (Ibid: 83). Of which (a) is known as the difference 
principle and (b) as the equal opportunity principle. These principles are 
arranged in serial order, i.e. former one overrides latter. Thus situations where 
certain individuals would trade their fundamental liberties for economic gains 
are not to be permitted.  
 
Regarding the difference principle Rawls directly states that: “…distribution of 
wealth and income need not be equal,” (Ibid: 61) only that, inequalities, 
whatever they are, must improve everyone’s position. Rawls also touches the 
question of efficiency as commonly understood as Pareto optimality: “The 
principle holds that a configuration is efficient whenever it is impossible to 
change it so as to make some persons better off without at the same time 
making other persons worse off.” Rawls makes the important point that Pareto 
optimality does not allow us to rank different efficient points and thus does not 
offer much help when deciding between different efficient points. (Ibid: 67-68.) 
Therefore in justice as fairness the principles of justice are prior to 
considerations of efficiency in his view. Thus distribution that is closer to 
maximum fairness as depicted by Rawls two principles are to be preferred to an 
efficient distribution that is further away from fair distribution. (Ibid: 69).  
 
 
2.1.4. Summary  
 
There are broad differences between the previously mentioned philosophers 
and their stance towards economic inequality. However they all agree that too 
much of it will cause various ailments and the underlying reasons for it are as 
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important as the symptoms themselves. With the exception of Marx they all 
agree that some level of inequality is natural and even desirable, but the level of 
economic inequality that starts to cause problems is undefined. All fine for 
philosophizing, but not much help for the real world. However what these 
fellows might have better grasped is that actual inequality (for which they had 
not the data we have today) is not as important for the average person as the 
perceived inequality as later studies have found (Gimpelson and Treisman, 
2015: 4, 28). And as economists discuss economic inequality, which by 
definition is quite technical metric, while for the common people inequality is 
not the defined by some “fancy” mathematical metric but by unfairness as 
Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom (2017:4-5) write: “people are not troubled by 
inequality for its own sake; indeed, they often prefer unequal distributions, 
both in laboratory conditions and in the real world. What really troubles 
people about the world we live in today are considerations that are related to 
inequality… such as adverse social consequences, a corrosion of democratic 
ideals, poverty, and, of most interest to us here, unfairness.”  
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3. Economic inequality – Income or wealth? 
 
In the previous chapter some of the philosophers talk about wealth, while others 
about income. As in most complex issues they are interlinked, but the strength 
of the link depends on circumstances. However most of the studies done on the 
subject have been about income. Mostly this is due to better data for income 
compared to wealth statistics. This paper focuses on income, but uses several 
studies about wealth inequality as well.  
 
Simon Kuztner’s influential paper in 1955 tried to answer a question that was 
unanswered at the time. The question was: “…how income inequality changes in 
the process of a country’s economic growth…” (Kuznets, 1955: 3). It is quite 
amazing to realize that some of the questions Kuznets poses in 1955 have only 
been answered during the last few years (at least in economics, as Kuznets 
originally ponders if researchers in sociology or demography would have 
answers even during his time). See for example the phenomenal work by Chetty, 
Hendren, Kline, Saez and Tuner (2014) or Chetty, Gursky, Hell, Hendren, 
Manduca and Narang (2017). Especially as inequality and growth was one of the 
most important issues in classical economics, where inequality was seen as 
necessary so those higher in the economic ladder could save relevant amount of 
their income thus creating investment.  
 
What Kuznets found (or thought he had found as he did admit later in his 
paper: “The paper is perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95 per cent 
speculation…”) (Kuznets, 1955: 26) was that inequality of income distribution 
increases during the early stages of development (within countries) but 
decreases as these economies reach later stages of development (Ibid, 1955: 22-
25). He also included his remarks that: “…speculation is an effective way of 
presenting a broad view of the field; and that so long as it is recognized as a 
collection of hunches calling for further investigation rather than a set of fully 
tested conclusions, little harm and much good may result.” (Ibid, 1955: 26). If 
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only all who read his paper actually understood this caveat, as his findings were 
later used as stylized facts and illustrated as Kuznets curve as seen in Figure 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was only during the 90’s when better data allowed Deininger and Squire 
(1998) to conclude: “there appears to be little systematic relationship between 
growth and changes in aggregate inequality.” In some specific regions the 
relationship was negative, so negative economic growth could increase 
inequality even at earlier development stages (in this case Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia after 1990 as they transition from central planning to something 
else). (Ravallion & Chen, 1997: 370). 
 
There are two groups of reasons why inequality increases as nations develop 
economically according to Kuznets. First one is related to savings. As per 
Kuznets only upper-income groups save, and this inequality in savings is greater 
than in income (and which in turn is higher than in consumption. Indeed only 
the highest decile quantile has higher share of income than consumption 
according to Nino-Zarazúa, Roope and Tarp, 2017: 670). And over a longer term 
this could cause increased share of income-yielding assets to the upper-income 
groups thus increasing income inequality. (Kuznets, 1955: 7) Second group in 
Kuznets view is the industrial structure of income distribution. Meaning a shift 
away from agriculture to industrialization and urbanization. The more rural 
population also has narrower distribution of income than in urban settings, and 
Figure 1. Kuznets curve 
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incomes tend to be higher in more urban settings thus as increasing share of 
population swift from agriculture to industrial production in more urban 
settings these two factors cause inequality to increase. (Kuznets, 1955: 7-8.).   
 
Kuznets curve stayed within economics as long as it did probably because it was 
simple, sensible and fit the data available at the time, or as Piketty and Saez 
write: “Kuznets’ overly optimistic theory of a natural decline in income 
inequality in market economies largely owed its popularity to the Cold War 
context of the 1950s as a weapon in the ideological fight between the market 
economy and socialism.” (Piketty & Saez, 2014: 842) and recent evidence does 
not fit with the inverted-U relationship between growth and inequality. This has 
been especially true for higher income countries since 1980’s. (Ferreira, 1999: 4-
5, Galbraith, 2007: 603, Milanovic, 2016: 46). 
 
There are several ways to specify and calculate economic inequality. Gini 
coefficient (or index) is the most commonly used measure. Theoretically it can 
obtain value between 0 and 1. Where 0 depicts a situation where all individuals 
have exactly same income, and 1 a situation where one person receives all 
income. Usually these Gini coefficients are calculated based on data from 
household surveys. However these surveys are not perfect, as they suffer from 
various handicaps. One of those is so called “upper-end truncation” which 
depicts a situation where upper-end distribution of income is not to be trusted 
as the ones with the highest incomes either refuse to be interviewed or 
understate their income. (Milanovic, 2011: 7-8) And as Rachel Sherman found 
as researcher of inequality the wealthy tend to underestimate their income and 
wealth even to her, which would not have had any possible negative outcome 
unlike disclosing real income to tax authorities (New York Times, 2017). One 
way to counter this is to use fiscal data for the upper end of the income 
distribution. However this approach, while probably at least not worse than 
household surveys, (Milanovic, 2011: 7, Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, 
Zucman, 2017: 29-30.) is also severely limited according to research by Gabrial 
Zucman, Niels Johannesen and Anette Alstadsaeter (2017). Zucman et al found 
that the higher you go on the income distribution the higher the chance that a) 
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this group has assets (and thus income based on those assets) in off-shore 
accounts b) this group leaves those assets unreported to tax authorities in order 
to evade taxes. In their research they estimate that the wealthiest 0,01% of 
households evade 25% of taxes they are due to pay versus average of 2,8% for all 
households. (Ibid: 48). So together these two findings imply that official Gini 
coefficients, that are based on either household surveys or fiscal data are lower 
than actual reality implies. (Ibid: 9). It is rather ironic that previously just the 
opposite view held sway, as it was commonly believed that households in the 
upper end of income distribution would evade taxes less than average as they 
are more likely to be audited by the tax authorities. (ibid: 27). To explain this, 
Zucman et al (2017) built a model to incorporate not just demand for tax 
evasion services but also the supply for it. Their model is consistent with the 
data available, and helps us understand how the supply of these services would 
explain why the wealthiest 0,01% of households use offshore accounts more 
often than the 0,05% of households as the relative cost of doing it is comparable 
for both. (Ibid: 27-32).  
 
Gini coefficient (𝐺) is calculated as follows.  
 
(1)    𝐺 = ! !"#$% !,!!!!  
 
Where 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑦, 𝑟! is the covariance between income (𝑦)  and ranks of all 
individuals according to their income (𝑟!) ranging from poorest individual (rank 
= 1) to the richest (rank = 𝑁). 𝑁 is the total number of individuals and 𝑦 is the 
mean income. (Milanovic, 1997: 45).  
 
Gini coefficient can theoretically range from 0 to 1 while in real world it ranges 
from 0,244 in Iceland to around 0,465 in Chile for disposable income Countries 
limited to OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) 
members (OECD 2016a), and global Gini coefficient is around 0,7, which is 
higher than for any individual country. (Milanovic, 2011: 8). Before venturing 
forth I want to highlight one additional issue. Most (if not all) Gini coefficients 
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used in this paper will be calculated based on disposable income. This is due to 
the fact that taxes and cash transfers have sizable impact on disposable income 
and as these vary between countries. An example follows: Sweden had primary 
income Gini coefficient as 0,466 in 2005 and for disposable income a Gini 
coefficient of 0,237, a massive difference. While the opposite example comes 
from South Africa which had a Gini coefficient of 0,664 for primary income in 
2012 and for disposable income a Gini coefficient of 0,572, which, while still 
sizable difference, is not comparable to Sweden. (Caminada, Wang, 
Goudswaard, Wang, 2017: 22).  
 
Gini coefficient is of course just one way to study economic inequality, for 
someone else income shares of different quantiles might be of more interest. In 
table 1 the  income shares for 1-5 quantiles for all OECD-members are listed as 
is disposable income Gini coefficient. 
 
 
Table 1. Income quantiles for OECD countries; data for 2014 or newer (OECD, 2016a). 
Income share in total income 
Gini	
coefficient	
Country	 1st	quintile	
2nd	
quintile	
3rd	
quintile	
4th	
quintile	
5th	
quintile	
2014	or	latest	(%)	
Australia 7,22 12,17 16,94 22,77 40,90 0,34 
Austria 8,68 13,97 17,88 22,74 36,73 0,28 
Belgium 8,80 13,74 18,55 23,69 35,22 0,27 
Canada 7,20 12,72 17,36 23,39 39,33 0,32 
Chile 4,95 9,18 13,40 19,86 52,61 0,47 
Czech Republic 9,66 14,39 17,67 22,17 36,11 0,26 
Denmark 9,76 14,33 18,28 22,67 34,96 0,25 
Estonia 6,34 11,29 16,40 23,55 42,42 0,36 
Finland 9,53 14,28 18,16 22,77 35,26 0,26 
France 8,74 13,51 17,24 22,04 38,47 0,29 
Germany 8,61 13,44 17,44 22,66 37,85 0,29 
Greece 6,47 12,33 17,08 23,20 40,92 0,34 
Hungary 8,28 13,72 17,85 23,17 36,98 0,29 
Iceland 10,10 14,63 18,25 22,50 34,52 0,24 
Ireland 8,15 12,97 17,14 22,61 39,13 0,31 
Israel 5,71 11,43 16,95 23,76 42,16 0,36 
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Italy 6,78 12,95 17,59 23,26 39,43 0,33 
Japan 6,51 12,61 17,57 23,84 39,48 0,33 
Korea 6,88 13,65 18,33 23,92 37,22 0,30 
Latvia 6,60 11,73 16,63 23,16 41,87 0,35 
Luxembourg 8,67 13,65 17,77 23,12 36,78 0,28 
Mexico 4,96 9,35 13,65 20,33 51,71 0,46 
Netherlands 8,64 13,79 17,90 22,72 36,95 0,28 
New Zealand 7,64 12,09 16,47 23,07 40,72 0,33 
Norway 9,15 14,95 18,62 22,79 34,49 0,25 
Poland 8,10 13,30 17,53 22,87 38,21 0,30 
Portugal 6,85 12,37 16,85 22,45 41,47 0,34 
Slovak 
Republic 8,83 14,36 18,08 22,85 35,88 0,27 
Slovenia 9,06 14,56 18,55 23,19 34,64 0,26 
Spain 6,12 12,10 17,23 23,84 40,72 0,35 
Sweden 8,71 13,77 18,04 22,79 36,70 0,28 
Switzerland 8,64 13,42 17,34 22,29 38,33 0,30 
Turkey 6,08 10,76 15,30 21,92 45,94 0,39 
United 
Kingdom 7,23 11,83 15,97 21,83 43,14 0,36 
United States 5,21 11,04 16,04 22,60 45,11 0,39 
OECD 7,7 12,9 17,2 22,8 39,5 0,32 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Average 7,68 12,87 17,20 22,75 39,50 0,32 
STDEV 1,42 1,40 1,19 0,84 4,28 0,05 
MAX 10,10 14,95 18,62 23,92 52,61 0,47 
MIN 4,95 9,18 13,40 19,86 34,49 0,24 
 
What is remarkable here is how similar share of income 4th quintile has in 
different OECD-countries. When income shares for each quintiles are plotted 
against Gini coefficient, the income shares follow Gini coefficients for all 
quintiles, except the 4th one. It is almost, that the 4th quintile, which can be 
understood as upper middle-class, is immune to the growing income inequality 
in OECD-countries, while all other quintiles are not. One could write a separate 
paper for the reasons behind this. Upper and lower tail shows more significant 
divergence between different countries. Chile in the mid 19th century was the 
most unequal of the different pre-industrial societies as figure 3 shows, and not 
much has happened since. Chile is the only OECD-member where the 5th 
quantile’s share is over half of all income. With this insight in mind it is easy, if 
slightly too simplistic way, to see both the rise of Allende and subsequent coup 
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by Pinochet. And indeed Chile is the only South American OECD-member. 
Friedman would be proud. (Friedman, 1991).  
 
Nino-Zarazua, Roope and Tarp (2017) provide comprehensive critique for the 
use of only Gini coefficient in inequality studies. The single biggest critique for 
use of Gini coefficient is following: “One especially important normative 
judgement regards the manner in which inequality is deemed to change as 
economies grow and the size of the “pie” to be divided increases…consider a 
situation in which everyone’s income doubles. Many might feel that if this 
change in the distribution means that the richest person can now buy two yachts 
rather than one, while the poorest can simply buy two chickens instead of one, 
inequality has surely increased.” (Nino-Zarazua et al, 2017: 665-666). In their 
terminology the use of Gini coefficient is “relative” measure and include that 
there are also “absolute” and “centrist” measures. However they also 
acknowledge that the use of Gini coefficient might be the most suitable when it 
comes to unit consistency. (Ibid, 2017: 666). 
 
 
4. The development of economic inequality in history and modern 
times  
 
The data becomes a problematic issue when looking at the years before 1970’s. 
However, thanks to important research done by many there are reasonable 
estimates for several different countries for different years. Figure 3 plots Gini 
estimates against the estimates of GDI per capita and includes inequality 
possibility frontier, which is based on assumption of a subsistence minimum of 
$PPP 300 (solid line).  
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What is remarkable in this figure it that it shows how current level’s of 
inequality do not differ that drastically from the pre-industrial times. England’s 
Gini estimate for year 1290 (0,367) is almost identical to United Kingdom’s Gini 
coefficient for year 2014 (0,358). It is rather fitting that United Kingdom’s Gini 
coefficient reached its highest point around 1860 (Milanovic, 2016: 49), around 
the same time as Hard Times by Charles Dickens was published. There are 
opposite examples as well. Holland had high level of inequality in 1732 in terms 
of Gini coefficient with value of 0,611 compared to current level of 0,283. 
(Milanovic et al, 2011:263, OECD 2016a). Overall level of inequality has 
decreased from pre-industrial times, at least for developed countries.  
 
Economic inequality was long viewed as peripheral topic within economics, 
more as an outcome rather than actual variable that can affect the rate 
economies grow. It has gained growing interest since the turn of millennium. 
(Ferreire, 1999: 1).  
 
Figure 2. Pre-industrial inequalities: Estimated Gini coefficients, and the inequality 
possibility frontier. (Milanovic, Lindert, Williamson, 2011: 265) 
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What makes studying economic inequality hard is that there is no coherent data 
available for most countries. For the countries that the data exist it is often a 
mix of different estimates and studies. (Solt, 2008: 1) However recent years has 
seen great improvement in this area as economic inequality has gained more 
momentum and interest. (See for example the development of World Income 
Inequality Database, which recently updated to version 3.4 or WEF Global Risk 
report for 2013, which included “global income disparity” as most likely of the 
risks to occur during the next ten years).  
 
While the situation is unique in each and every OECD-country, there are some 
trends to be spotted since 1970’s. Income inequality first started to rise in the 
late 1970’s in United Kingdom, United States and in Israel, while declining on 
average in OECD-countries (Galbraith, 2007: 605). Moving then years forward 
and this rise in inequality had touched most, but not yet all, OECD-members. In 
the 90’s and 2000’s the phenomenon had reached even the previously low-
inequality countries such as Denmark and Sweden while at the same time 
strengthening even further in previously mentioned United Kingdom, United 
States and Israel. On average this meant that the Gini coefficient had average 
value of 0,29 in the mid 1980’s and 0,314 in 2014 for OECD-membership 
countries. (OECD, 2011: 22, OECD 2016a, Cingano: 2014: 10). As usual these 
aggregate numbers do not tell the whole story, as within the OECD-countries 
there are countries that did not experience increase in Gini coefficient during 
this time period (1985-2008) (Greece and Turkey) and some countries have not 
increased changes in inequality (France, Hungary, Belgium). (OECD, 2011: 24). 
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Figure 25  above shows the difference in Gini coefficients between market 
income and disposable income. While market incomes are higher in all 
countries, the situation varies strongly. In some countries, such as Slovenia, the 
disposable income Gini coefficient is way lower than for market income, while 
in Switzerland the Gini coefficient is similar for both.  
 
 
There is growing number of pessimists who believe that the current levels of 
inequality are here to stay, and without dramatic negative developments current 
trends cannot be altered. This view gained much intellectual ammunition after 
Walter Scheidel’s book The Great Leveler: Violence and History of Inequality 
from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First century was published in 2016. In it 
Scheidel writes bluntly: “…throughout recorded history, the most powerful 
leveling invariably resulted from the most powerful shocks. Four different 
kinds of violent ruptures have flattened inequality: mass mobilization warfare, 
                                                   
5 Late 2000s refers to a year between 2006 and 2009. The OECD average excludes Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Mexico and Turkey (no information on market income available). Working age is defined as 18-65 
years old. Countries are ranked in increasing order of disposable income inequality. (OECD, 2011: 36). 
Figure 3. Market incomes are distributed more unequally than disposable income. (OECD, 
2011: 36) 
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transformative revolution, state failure, and lethal pandemics…” (Scheidel, 
2016: 6). Perhaps the future is as grim and somber as Scheidel writes. Hauner, 
Milanotic and Naidu (2017: 37) provide some empirical evidence to the classical 
theory of imperialism, in which inequality played a role in igniting the First 
World War. While Piketty (2014: 271-274) shows how first and second World 
War contributed to decreased inequality. However I believe Scheidel missed 
some positive developments in his book. Sweden is good example of a country 
where inequality decreased in the 20th century without major violence. 
(Alvaredo et al, 2017: 73-74). Sweden might be on the other hand a unique 
country in this retrospect as it was one of the only countries in Western Europe, 
which did not participate in Second World War. Perhaps one needs not to 
participate in great leveling, to gain the decreasing inequality, if all your 
neighbors do? Or perhaps social norms explain this, as it is rather easy to 
understand how the relative well off, compared to their neighbors, Swedish 
population would agree to broadly share the gains from productivity growth, 
especially given the fear of communism some few hundred kilometers to the 
east. (Piketty and Saez, 2003: 33-34).  
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5. Reasons for growing economic inequality  
 
Increases in income inequality have been due to changes in distribution of 
wages, which on average explain 75% of household incomes (OECD 2011: 22). 
But this explanation is not very good or thorough. It is as if one tried to explain 
why Germany beat Brazil in the world cup semi-final of 2014 by saying “they 
made more goals”, which is factually correct, but does nothing to explain the 6 
goal difference. Luckily the same OECD paper provides a framework to look 
deeper into the issue of growing income inequality, which this paper follows in 
the next chapters. 
 
 
5.1. Globalization 
 
Traditional international trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin) tells that increased 
trade increases wages for skilled workers in the higher income country, and 
decreases them for the unskilled workers. Opposite is true for the lower income 
country. Thus inequality increases in the higher income country and decreases 
in the lower income country, or this is what the theory tells us. (Kremer & 
Maskin, 2006: 2). Empirical evidence on the other hand does not show this 
expected reduction in inequality in poor countries. (Kremer & Maskin, 2006: 6). 
OECD (2011:24) also highlights studies showing that increased trade integration 
increases inequality for everyone involved. Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou 
(2013: 273-274) on the other hand find that trade liberalization and export 
growth are associated with lower income inequality. They looked into the 
income growth for the 5 quintiles and found that export growth is associated 
with a rise for the bottom four quintiles, thus decreasing income inequality. 
(Ibid: 274) They also acknowledge that what is traded affect how inequality 
develops; agricultural exports especially decrease inequality in developing 
countries (Ibid: 301). Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström found that increased 
trade increases top share of income in Anglo-Saxon countries, but not in 
continental Europe. (2009: 29). Vivarelli (2007:1) argues that total aggregate 
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trade flows are weakly related with income inequality. Going to a more granular 
level they find that trade between developed and middle-income countries 
increases income inequality for the middle-income countries. The empirical 
evidence is mixed and seems to show that globalization is country, (sector) and 
time specific issue, and general theories, for some reason or another, does not 
cover this complexity. 
 
 
5.2. Financialization and Financial Globalization 
 
Financialization is commonly understood to have begun in the 1980’s with 
deregulatory reforms in the US. It has many meanings but for the sake of clarity 
I will follow the one offered by Kus (2012: 482-483), which explains it as 
following: “it encompasses several intertwined processes: (1) the growing 
share of the financial sector in the economy, (2) the growing reliance of non-
financial firms’ on financial activities as a source of revenue, (3) the emergence 
of a new corporate governance view that sees the firm as a bundle of tradable 
assets, and (4) the increasing of household engagement with financial markets 
as consumers of credit or as purchasers of investment products, seeking to 
generate income or sustain living standards.” One of the easiest ways to 
understand this is to look at the profits made by the finance sector. For the US 
the profit share rose from below 20% in the 1980’s to above 40% twenty years 
later, and how the share of portfolio income for non-financial companies rose 
from less than 15% in 1960’s to over 40% in the 1980’s. This was not limited to 
US, as all OECD countries took part in this development. (Kus, 2012: 483-484).  
 
Kus provides four ways how financilization has contributed to growing 
inequality. First, the expansion of finance has come as expense of the real, 
productive economy, which has thus shirked profitability for non-financial 
companies and decreased wages for many middle-class and blue-collar workers. 
Secondly, this turn has weakened policies and institutions that have 
traditionally curbed income inequalities. Third, the dependence of non-financial 
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companies to the financial sector has encouraged focus on the short-term 
profits. Fourth is how stock market boom has contributed to the increased share 
of income to the top. And how the share of income gained from investments and 
capital has increased for the highest quintile, which is also taxed less heavily 
than ordinary sources of income. (Kus, 2012: 485). Roine et al also report in 
their blunt language: “Financial development is also pro-rich” (2009:21). 
 
Financial globalization is the second half of this chapter. Especially as this 
development has also concurred with the rise of income inequality. External 
financial assets and liabilities have increased from 36% in 1960 to around 400% 
in 2015. (BIS, 2017: 100). Foreign investment liabilities as percentage of global 
GDP rose from 51% in 1995 to 183% in 2016. (McKinsey, 2017:7).  
 
What is even more interesting is that this development has concentrated to the 
advanced countries, until 1990’s external positions of both the advanced and 
emerging market economies were somewhat similar. After that the cross-border 
assets and liabilities of advanced economies rose more than by a factor of four, 
while in emerging market economies this factor was less than two. (BIS, 2017: 
100-101).  
 
Maybe this increase in cross-border assets explains the growing share of income 
for the top quintile, as we now know that bonds, into which the members of the 
top quintile have usually invested (Salti, 2015: 821-822), are not that good 
investment in terms of return in the long run, while equities are. (Jordà, Knoll, 
Kuvshinov, Schularick, Taylor, 2017: 13). And the majority (92% for US) of the 
domestic stocks are already owned by the top quintile (Wolff, 2014: 42). Wolff 
also found that between 1983 and 2013 the wealthiest quintile collected almost 
100% of total growth in wealth in the US. (2014: 15). Jaumotte, Lall and 
papageorgiou (2013: 296) also find a positive relationship between financial 
globalization and rising inequality, and FDI assets in particular, seem to 
increase inequality. OECD (2011: 29) finds contradictory evidence, in their own 
words: “…nor financial openness had a significant impact on either wage 
inequality or employment trends within the OECD countries.” But in the next 
38  
paragraph say that increased outward FDI was associated with increased wage 
divergence for the upper half of households.  
 
 
5.3. Institutions, taxes and government transfers 
 
Most OECD countries made regulatory reforms in the years between 1980 and 
2008 to increase competition in various sectors and to increase flexibility in the 
labour markets. (OECD, 2011: 30). These reforms included loosened 
employment protection and relaxed product-market regulations for most OECD 
members. Some cut taxes for labour income for low-income workers and some 
others cut unemployment benefits. While these decreased minimum wages 
relatively to median wage, they also increased employment levels. They also 
increased wage inequality. OECD (2011: 31) makes the point explicit by writing 
how regulatory and institutional changes “…tend to have contrasting effects on 
employment and wage distribution.” Rather unsatisfactory finding as income 
inequality growth has varied heavily between OECD membership countries. 
(OECD, 2011: 23). Only increase in educational levels seems to be the silver 
bullet that dances through Scylla and Charybdis. (OECD, 2011: 31, Neves, 
Afonso & Silva, 2016: 398).  
 
Looking at the United States Levy and Temin (2007) found that income 
distribution is strongly shaped by a set of economic institutions. They argue 
against the skill-biased technical change (and globalization) being the most 
important factor for income distribution changes since 1980’s. (Ibid, 5). In their 
view, how the set of institutions affect can be compared to how gravity in 
different planets in our galaxy works. It affects in each and every one of them, 
but the thrust needed for the spacecraft to escape gravity varies between 
planets. Only a change to this set of institutions can create less inequitable 
distribution of income, where the fruits of productivity gains are spread more 
equitably. (Ibid, 43-44).   
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Immervoll and Richardson (2011) studied how ex post policies of different 
OECD countries have accelerated or slowed the trend towards more unequal 
income distribution. Overall they found that government policies have become 
more redistributive over the past 20 years (around 1986-2006), but this 
increase was at most half of the increase in market-income inequality. And 
while the trend of increasing income inequality was slowing in the last ten years 
(around years 1996-2006), the disposable income inequality increased faster 
during this period due to reduced redistribution. (Immervoll and Richardson, 
2011: 65-67). They also found that benefits play a stronger role in reducing 
income inequality than taxes, even if the size of the latter is bigger in aggregate 
terms. (Ibid: 62) (This probably is due to the fact that Gini coefficients are 
sensitive to the “fatness of tails”, Taleb, 2015: 1). This is in line with the results 
found by, Roine et al (2009: 5) as in their research they found that government 
spending increases income share for the first four quintiles. They also found 
that top marginal taxes affect disportionately (and positively) income shares for 
the first 9 deciles. This is somewhat against the findings of OECD (2011: 38), 
which found that income taxes seem to play relatively minor role in reducing 
income inequality. Wang and Caminada (2011: 2) find in their research that out 
of 100 % of income reduction, taxes reduce income inequality by 15% and 
transfers by 85% on average. Their study included 36 LIS countries.  
 
 
5.4. Technology 
 
Technological development has often been seen as the biggest driver in the 
increase of income inequality. (OECD, 2011: 26). This is due to the fact that 
technology, especially ICT, is seen as being skill-biased. The same OECD paper 
lists it as being bigger factor than globalization or “closer trade integration”. 
Jaumotte et al found in their calculations that technological development is by 
far biggest contributor to the increase in income inequality (2013: 300). Their 
findings demonstrate the theory of how technological demand increases 
demand for higher skills and substitutes low-skill labour with technology. 
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However they also acknowledge that the effect may vary from sector to a sector, 
and lack of comprehensive data makes it hard to say at this point, but on 
average the effect is clear. (Ibid: 302-303). FDI and technological progress seem 
to walk hand in hand as OECD (2011:29) and Jaumotte et al find in their 
research (2013: 302). Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka and Tsounta 
(2015:19) find similar findings; skill premium has risen in most OECD countries 
from the level seen at the end of last millennium, for some reason this premium 
decreased in Finland and Sweden, and this rise is seen as being driven by 
technological development. Per se technological development, without the 
increase in skill premium, is seen as having rather mild effect on income 
inequality for advanced economies, but stronger effect for emerging and 
developing countries. (Ibid: 27). Korinek and Stiglizt are one of the firsts to 
wonder how ongoing artificial intelligence (AI) development might affect 
income inequality in their paper published in December 2017. In it they discuss 
the possibility that AI will supercharge current trends in terms of income 
inequality. The reasoning behind this is that while human intelligence is 
distributed quite narrowly, AI might not be. It is imaginable to assume that the 
wealthiest humans will become, in their words: “orders of magnitude more 
productive”. (Korinek and Stiglizts, 2017: 34-35). Acemoglu and Restrepo 
(2018: 33) offer support for this hypothesis. In their view the biggest 
contributor is “mismatch between technology and skills”, which contributes to 
decreasing labour demand and growing income inequality (2018: 2) 
 
 
5.5. Fall of labour share  
 
One of Kaldor’s stylized facts said that the share of output going to labour would 
stay same. (Kaldor, 1961: 173). As often happens with old “truths”, has 
happened to this stylized fact as well, it no longer is true. Autor, Dorn, Katz, 
Patterson and Van Reenen provide handy international comparison for this 
phenomenon. (2017: 31). Out of 16 countries they plotted for years between 
1970 and 2010, only in two the labour share increased, and even there it was 
minimal, (one could almost say that it stayed at the same level as in the 
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beginning of the time period), while in others the labour share decreased. And 
as usual, while there is disagreement to the degree this fall is due to 
measurement metrics, there seems to be consensus that this fall is real and 
significant. (Ibid: 1). This is worrying trend as it means that wages and salaries 
represent decreasing share of total output, and as wages and salaries represent 
majority of total income for most people as seen in chapter 4.6., and as wealth is 
more unevenly distributed than income. (Wolf, 2014: 50, OECD, 2015a: 5).  
 
Autor et al provide evidence for the theory that this fall in labour share is due to 
increased market concentration within different sectors, which in turn is caused 
by “superstar” firms. In their view the markets have changed so that the 
“superstar” firm within sector gain disproportionate “rewards” compared to 
prior times, and as their market share increases labour share decreases. (Ibid: 
25). This issue is thus not only macroeconomic, but also microeconomic. De 
Loecker and Eeckhout also find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that 
increased market power causes labour share to decrease. (2017: 17-19). 
 
 
5.6 Summary of reasons behind growing inequality 
 
Table 2 provides summary of research mentioned in the previous chapters. As 
seen in the table there is growing amount of research done by the reasons 
behind growing income inequality.  
 
Table 2. Summary of reasons behind growing inequality. 
Theme Researcher(s) Effect 
G Kremer and Maskin 
(2006) 
Increase in global trade increases (+) income inequality for 
all countries involved. 
G Jaumotte, Lall and 
Papageorgiou (2013) 
Trade liberalization (-) and export growth (-) have effect on 
income inequality. 
G Roine, Vlachos and 
Waldenström (2009) 
Increased global trade affects inequality (+) for Anglo-Saxon 
countries and (-) for continental Europe.  
G Vivarelli (2007) Trade has weak effect on income inequality. 
F Kus (2002) Affects income inequality by: 1. the expansion of finance has 
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come as expense of the real, productive economy (+) 2. 
Weakened policies and institutions that have traditionally 
curbed income inequality (+) 3. Increased focus on the short-
term profits (+) 4. The share of income gained from 
investments and capital has increased (+). 
F Jaumotte, Lall and 
Papageorgiou (2013) 
Financial globalization (+) and foreign direct investments (+) 
have effect on income inequality. 
F OECD (2011) Financial openness (=) has no effect on wage inequality or to 
employment. 
I Levy and Temin 
(2007) 
Current set of institutions increase income inequality (+). 
I OECD (2011) Regulatory reforms tend to have contrasting effects on 
employment (-) and wage distribution (+). 
I Immervoll and 
Richardson (2011) 
Government transfers and distribution decreased the speed 
of income inequality in the 1980’s and 1990’s but later that 
effect was slower. Transfers more effective in curbing income 
inequality than taxes. 
I Roine, Vlachos and 
Waldenström (2009) 
Government spending (-) and taxes (-) have effect on income 
inequality. 
I OECD (2011) Taxes have minor role in income inequality (=). 
I Wang and Caminada 
(2011) 
Transfers (-) have much bigger role than taxes (-) do in 
curbing income inequality. 
T OECD (2011) Technology (+) increases income inequality. 
T Jaumotte, Lall and 
Papageorgiou (2013) 
Technological development (+) is the biggest contributor to 
income inequality. This development goes hand in hard with 
the increase in FDI (+). 
T Dabla-Norris, 
Kochhar, 
Suphaphiphat, Ricka 
and Tsounta (2015) 
Per se Technological development, has dissimilar effect in 
developed countries (=) and emerging countries (+), but it 
increases skill premiums in all countries (+), which has 
significant effect in income inequality. 
T Korinek and Stiglizt 
(2017). 
AI (+) will supercharge current trends in terms of income 
inequality. 
T Acemoglu and 
Restrepo (2018). 
Mismatch between technology and skills decreases labour 
demand (+).  
L Autor, Dorn, Katz, 
Patterson and Van 
Reenen (2017). 
Labour demand has decreased in most developed countries 
(+) due to market concentration (+). 
L Loecker and Market concentration (+) causes labour share to decrease (+). 
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Eeckhout (201) 
Legend: G = Globalization, F = Financialization and financial globalization, I = Institutions, 
taxes and government transfers, T= Technology and L= Fall of labour share. 
 
 
5.7. Theoretical reasons why economic inequality affects economic 
growth 
 
In the previous chapters the most important reasons for growing inequality 
were listed. All well and good, but what matters most is how all these affect 
economic growth. And the reason for this is not just economic growth for 
growth’s sake, but as Benjamin Friedman has written, economic growth is 
beneficial for various reasons for the whole society. And the lack of it brings 
many ills, misfortunes, mischiefs and a whole range of undesired behaviors 
forth in fellow citizens. (Friedman, 2005: 5, 50, 293, 325).  
 
OECD (2015b: 61-62) lists three theoretical reasons for why inequality harms 
economic growth.  
 
Theory A is usually referred as “endogenous fiscal policy theory”. This theory 
states that as inequality reaches levels not acceptable for voters, they demand 
higher taxation and regulation, which reduces incentives to invest, thus leading 
to decreased economic growth. (OECD, 2015b: 61; Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 
2014:8). 
 
Theory B is referred as “human capital accumulation theory”. In this theory 
poorer households lack the funds and income to invest appropriately into 
themselves (usually this is seen as lack of investment to education), and as 
chapter 5.3., shows, education seems to be the sole silver bullet for both growth 
and smaller inequality. (OECD, 2015b: 61; Ostry et al, 2014:8). 
 
Theory C states that adoption of new technology depends on certain level of 
domestic demand, if domestic demand is below this threshold, these 
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technologies have no chance to be adopted widely, thus leading to decreased 
economic growth. (OECD, 2015b: 61).  
 
The same OECD paper also lists two theories that say that inequality might 
increase economic growth.  
 
Theory D says that higher inequality provides incentives to work harder, and if 
education provides higher rate of return, then this might incentivize people to 
invest in education thus leading to higher economic growth. (OECD, 2015b: 61; 
Ostry et al, 2014: 7). 
 
Theory E argues that higher inequality increases savings, as individuals with 
higher incomes tend to save more and have lower propensity to consume their 
income, which in turn leads to capital accumulation. (OECD, 2015b: 61, Ostry et 
al, 2014:7). 
 
Out of these three theories, this paper focuses and continues on the theory C, 
which is clearly linked to theory E as output Y can only be saved or consumed, 
but not both.  
 
 
5.8. Empirical evidence for negative link between inequality and 
economic growth 
 
In the following chapter I will list several empirical papers and their findings 
regarding inequality and economic growth. As inequality has gained more focus, 
the amount of empirical papers regarding this issue has grown, but what is 
remarkable is that the previously mentioned Kaldor (1955) and Kuznets (1955) 
are cited in almost all of them, even if their findings (stylized facts) have been 
shown to be incorrect by later research. Perhaps Max Planck was wrong by 
saying: “Die Wahrheit triumphiert nie, ihre Gegner sterben nur aus”. The 
progress seems to be even slower. This paper follows the road set by others. 
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As with the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence is also mixed. 
Following the structured used by Ostry et al (2014: 10-11) for separate 
mechanisms that might affect economic growth negatively this paper starts with 
redistribution.  
 
Ostry et al (2014: 17) find evidence that contradicts the common classical 
theory, which says there is a trade-off between redistribution and growth. In 
their findings redistribution is statistically insignificant (although slightly 
positive), while net inequality has negative coefficient for growth. In other 
words, they find no evidence that there exists a negative relationship between 
redistribution and growth. Babu, Bhaskaran and Venkatesh (2016: 109) find 
similar results. Their findings also contradict the theory of negative relationship 
between redistribution and growth, and indeed find a statistically significant (at 
the 5% level) and tiny positive effect for growth on redistribution. These 
findings are contradictory to the earlier findings, which found that more 
inequality causes more redistribution (in OECD-countries). (Persson and 
Tabillini, 1994: 616) Ostry et al find evidence that the effect is nonlinear and 
current levels of redistribution seen in OECD-countries are less than optimal for 
growth. They also find that it is indeed possible to have level of distribution that 
is detrimental to growth, in their own words: “the overall effect of 
redistribution is pro-growth, with the possible exception of extremely large 
redistributions.” (Ostry et al, 2014: 21-23). Cingano (2014: 19-20) find similar 
evidence and that redistribution at worst is neutral to growth. 
 
Bagchi and Svejnar (2015: 506) are one of the few who note that not all Gini 
coefficients are equal in this regard. In their example they point that Gini 
coefficient is similar in UK and Indonesia, but political connections play hugely 
larger role in latter than in the former country. Bagchi and Svejnar (2015: 524-
525) find empirical evidence that wealth inequality caused by politically 
obtained wealth is significantly detrimental for economic growth, while income 
inequality is not found to be statistically significant. This is what Aristotle 
warned about a few millenniums ago. (Aristotle, 1995: 203-204). Glaener, 
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Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003: 199-200) find empirical evidence for the effect. 
When politically connected con the rules for their own benefit, it causes all kind 
of ills and general feeling, which is illustrated magnificently by a character 
Bodie in the TV-show The Wire: “This game is rigged, man. We like the little 
bitches in the chessboard”6  
 
Time aspect of inequality is another point that has gained more focus. Ostry et 
al (2014: 23), find that inequality increases risk that growth spells end and that 
inequality is “powerful determinant…of medium term growth.” (Ostry et al, 
2014: 25). Babu et al find that inequality has negative effect on growth in the 
long run, but is insignificant in the short term. Redistribution in their model is 
pro-growth in both timeframes; their data included 29 emerging economies 
(2016: 109). Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller (2014: 81) find that inequality 
promotes growth in the short term, but reduces it in the long run, and the long 
term effect is stronger. Kennedy, Smyth, Valadkhani and Chen (2017: 119) find 
that inequality reduces growth, but only after few years delay. Kirschenmann, 
Malinen and Nyberg find evidence that income inequality is relevant predictor 
for financial crises, which are never pro-growth events. They end their paper 
with worrying note: “Alarmingly, if income inequality has the destabilizing 
effect that our results suggest, then the current trend of increasing inequality 
could set the stage for further financial turmoil“. (2016: 178-179). Drennan 
(2017: 97-98) finds that growing income inequality was major factor behind the 
financial crisis. Brennan also points that as middle-class incomes stagnated: 
“that rising prices above the rate of inflation for key necessities – shelter, 
healthcare, and education –pressed households to maintain their consumption 
through massive borrowing. And one reason for that run-up in prices was 
because higher income households were capturing a much larger share of 
income than in the past…so their demand soared for those categories.” 
(Drennan, 2017: 106). Amronin, De Nardi and Schulze (2018) find some 
evidence that increased wealth inequality played role in lengthening the 
                                                   
6 The Wire: Season 4, episode 13. 
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downturn after the financial crisis due to borrowing constraints for the less 
wealthy.  
 
Forbes (2000: 885) and Li and Zou (1998: 332) on the other hand found 
positive link between inequality and growth, while Castelló (2010: 293) finds a 
pro-growth relationship for inequality and growth in higher income countries. 
Given the quite straightforward language of the papers that find negative link, 
the words used by Forbes, Li & Zou and Castelló seem quite careful. As seen in 
these comments: “…we shall admit that the association between income 
inequality and growth is a very complicated matter” (Li and Zou, 1998: 332) or 
“it is too soon, however, to draw any definite policy conclusions.” (Forbes, 
1998: 885) compared to “On the other hand it indicates that policies that help 
limiting or – ideally – reversing the long-run rise in inequality would not only 
make societies less unfair, but also richer. In particular, the present analysis 
highlights the importance of two pillars of a policy strategy for tackling rising 
inequalities and promoting equality of opportunities.” (Cingano, 2014: 28-29). 
Or perhaps this careful language is the reason Forbes has her article in 
American Economic Review, while Cingano has his in less prestigious OECD 
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers. 
 
Perhaps it is as Neves et al (2016: 398) found in their meta-analysis on the 
existing empirical literature on the relationship between inequality and growth, 
that the one and only truth in economics, seems to hold in this case as well, in 
their own words: “Policy makers should avoid thinking of a global, single 
pattern for the inequality–growth relationship because such a pattern does not 
exist. Instead, they should take into consideration the existence of specific and 
particular effects that differ from country to country and region to region and 
that vary with the type of inequality and the time span considered.“ Or as one 
could summarize their finding: It depends.  
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6. Public debt 
 
 
6.1. Public deficits 
 
The following chapters follow the direction set by Karlin (2013) and add to it. 
Public debt can mean either central government debt or other public debt, such 
as one taken by state or municipality. In this study however public debt will 
stand for central government debt for the case of consistency and 
understandability.  
 
Budget deficit is born when government purchases and transfers exceed 
government revenues. Government purchases and transfers is G₁, state 
revenues are T₁ and rD₁ denotes interest payments of public debt in the period 
₁. The government budget can thus be represented as seen in formula (1). 
 
(2)   rD₁ + G₁ - T₁ = Government budget balance 
 
If government purchases and transfers exceed government revenues we have a 
deficit budget. If government revenues exceed government purchases and 
transfers we have a surplus budget. In the case of budget deficit central 
government has to rely on debt to cover the expenditures. This is done by 
issuing government bonds. Budget deficit can be divided into two different 
subgroups which are 1) primary deficit which means a situation where G > T 
and 2) deficit which is caused by interest payments from existing public debts. 
From this it can be seen that budget deficit is possible even in a situation where 
state revenues exceed government purchases and transfers (Burda & Wyplosz, 
2009: 167).  
 
Governments usually target certain debt-to-GDP ratios. In the following 
formula one can easily understand how economic growth and budget deficit are 
tied together when pursuing those target ratios. P stands for primary deficit, r 
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for real interest rate for existing public debt, g for economic growth, DEBT for 
existing public debt and S for central bank profits. 
 
(3)   P/GDP = (r – g) DEBT/GDP – S/GDP 
One can easily see how higher debt-to-GDP ratio requires either higher 
economic growth g or lower interest rates r for the P/GDP to remain unchanged.  
 
 
6.2. Short and long term effects of public debt 
 
Budget deficits and the resulting increase in the public debt can in the short 
term be economically justified, if the deficit is due to stagnation as a result of 
economic cycle. In a previously described situation, public sector can increase 
aggregate demand and public investments with debt financing, and thus 
alleviate consequences of stagnation in Keynesian manner. Effectiveness of this 
fiscal expansion depends whether or not monetary policy is aligned to this 
expansion. Theory states that if central bank moves to offset the impact of fiscal 
expansions through monetary tightening, then private investments will suffer 
from “crowding out”-effect. This effect is due to increase in interest rates, which 
will decrease private investment. If monetary policy is aligned to fiscal policy, 
this “crowding out”-effect will decrease the effectiveness of fiscal expansion, but 
will not completely offset it (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1995: 632-633). 
Developing nations can benefit even more than developed nations from 
reasonable levels of borrowing as they lack capital and are more likely to have 
investment opportunities with rates of return higher than in advanced 
economies (Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2004: 5). Whether or not fiscal 
expansion is effective way to increase aggregate demand in the first place 
depends on fiscal multipliers. If the multiplier is less than 1, any increase in 
fiscal policy will actually reduce aggregate demand, on the other hand if 
multiplier is larger than 1, fiscal expansion of 1 € will increase aggregate 
demand for more than 1 €. “A multiplier well in excess of one is possible when 
monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, and in this case welfare 
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increases if government purchases expand to partially fill the output gap that 
arises from the inability to lower interest rates.“ (Woolford, 2011: 1).  
 
In the long run the effect of debt is different. Consider the following example, if 
the budget is balanced and net exports of goods and services (NX) are zero, 
domestic savings must equal investments.  
 
(4)   S+(T-G)=I + NX 
 
In a situation described above, budget deficits will lower domestic savings, 
which would otherwise be directed to private investments. As domestic savings 
decrease the interest rate must rise to balance the demand and supply of capital. 
This rise in interest rates will compress investments and hence over a period of 
time will result in a smaller domestic capital stock and thus in a smaller future 
national income (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998:16–17). The decline in domestic 
saving can be financed by increased capital inflows from abroad, which could 
dampen and perhaps even eliminate the increase in domestic interest rates. 
Foreign capital inflows entail a different economic cost as they represent a 
reduction in net foreign investment and hence a reduction in future national 
income. From this it can be conducted, that even if interest rates remain 
unchanged the decreased domestic savings will reduce the capital owned by 
domestic actors. Only in the absolute case where an increase in the budget 
deficit is entirely offset by an increase in private savings there won’t be a 
reduction in the future national income, in all other cases the budget deficit will 
reduce the capital stock owned by domestic actors and thus lead to reduced 
future national income (Gale and Orszag, 2002: 7-8). 
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6.3. Historical development of public debt 
 
Sovereign governments and countries have issued government bonds for 
centuries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010: 8) while history tells us how Alexander 
the Great borrowed much of the money he needed to conquer the Persian 
Empire during the fourth century B.C (MacDonald, 2006: 156, 43). From this it 
can be easily conducted that public debt is definitely not a new invention. Also 
problems relating to public debt are not new ones, as they have occurred 
previously in the history for hundreds of years. While outright defaults are 
getting more rare compared to historical norm, they still do happen. One of the 
latest countries to default was Argentina in 2014 (D'Alessandro and Kraul, 
2014), but such is the demand for high yielding bonds, that just three years 
later, the same country in question rolled a 100-year bond which was 
oversubscribed. (Cohen and Rabouin, 2017) In OECD countries7, the average 
debt-to-gdp ratio in 2015 was 88 %. Economic crisis, which started in 2007 
have had a major impact on this, as the average debt-to-gdp ratio in OECD-
countries was only 67 % back in 1995 and 36% in 1980. On average the debt-to-
gdp ratio increased by 31 % between 1995 and 2015. (OECD, 2018). 
 
 
6.4. Public debt and its variations 
 
The ideal debt classification made by Panizzi (2007: 5) as seen in Figure 4. has 
four major factors.  
                                                   
7 Countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States.  
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First of those is the currency the debt is issued in. Countries have two choices, 
either to issue the debt in domestic currency or in foreign currency (Usually US 
dollars, but Eurobonds are also used as are some other currencies). This choice 
matters heavily as seen in the currency crises in East Asia, Russia and Mexico in 
the 90’s where external debt was seen to exacerbate the severity of the crises. 
(Bordo, Meissner and Stuckler, 2010: 642). On the other hand domestic debt 
seems to be costlier in terms of interest rates. (Panizzi, 2007: 9).  
 
Second difference regards the holders of the bond in question. Are they 
residents of the country, or non-residents. (Panizzi, 2007: 5). Often the terms 
used in this context are domestic- and external debt. This is somewhat against 
the model seen in figure 2. Panizzi offers three different definitions for the term 
domestic debt (2007: 4). First to mean bond issued in local currency, second to 
mean bond hold by resident of the country, and third to mean the domestic 
legislation where the bond was issued. This paper uses the second definition. In 
real life governments tend to issue bonds in their own currency, under their own 
jurisdiction, but the lenders are increasingly international lenders (Bordo et al, 
Figure 4. Ideal debt classification (Panizzi, 2007: 5). 
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2010: 642-643), thus in the data used for this paper these cases are seen as 
being external debt.  
 
Third difference is about the type of holders. Whether they are banks, 
institutional investors, private investors or international finance institutions 
(such as World Bank, European Investment Bank etc.). (Panizzi, 2007: 5). 
 
Fourth and last factor is about the type of instrument used by sovereign 
governments. Choices are either bank loans or bonds issued to markets. 
(Panizzi, 2007: 5). 
 
 
6.5. Domestic and external debt 
 
Domestic or internal debt means public (or government) debt, which is in the 
possession of country’s own residents. Domestic debt is usually seen as less 
burdensome as compared to external debt. Reasoning for this can be summed 
up in a phrase “we owe it all to ourselves”. But even domestic debt requires 
payments of interest to bondholders and thus taxes must be levied for this 
purpose. Taxes then introduce microeconomic distortions, and therefore the 
result is less favorable compared to a situation, where there would not be taxes 
levied for interest payments (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1995: 636). Barro (1974: 
1116) argued in his classical paper, “that there is no persuasive theoretical case 
for treating government debt, at the margin, as a net component of perceived 
household wealth.”  
 
Due to its limited role in defaults and other economic crises (or so it was 
thought for quite long) data on domestic debt was sporadic and mostly ignored 
until the late 2000’s.  Research done by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011: 320) has 
shown this to be wrong, as domestic debt has usually played bigger role than 
external debt in debt crises.  
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Even though most major economies have counted on their own citizens when 
issuing public debt, international debt markets have existed for centuries 
(Bordo, Meisner and Redish, 2003: 7).  
 
The prime reason why external debt can be seen as more harmful than domestic 
debt can be summed up in the following phrase “This debt does involve a net 
subtraction from the resources available to people in the debtor nation” 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1995: 636). There are also fewer tools for reducing 
the external debt, as neither inflation nor financial repression is feasible 
(Reinhart et al. 2012: 5). And domestic debt does not in case increase the risk of 
foreign gunboats making demands, as external debt used to do (Hauner et al, 
2017: 48). 
 
Of the over 300 defaults Reinhart and Rogoff (2011: 327-328) combined in their 
data for their research. Of those only 68 were de jure defaults to domestic debt 
holders. The authors emphasize the difficulty spotting these defaults, as their 
data goes back to 19th century, and therefore believe the number to be lower 
than actual number. The difference is still quite a large, as they include 250 
external debt defaults in this data. However domestic debt that is issued in own 
currency can also be dealt with inflation, so why the de jure defaults then? 
Reinhart and Rogoff believe this to be due to the fact, that high inflation causes 
all sorts of problems to the banking and financial sector. Governments have 
other options to deal with domestic debt, including financial repression. 
However even that has its own costs, as inflation and financial repression go 
hand-in-hand according to research. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011: 328). 
 
 
6.7. How public debt affects economic growth? 
 
Theoretical literature tends to point to a negative relationship between public 
debt and economic growth. Following is a short review of theoretical literature 
on the issue. 
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Following previous work made by Buchanan and Meade, Modigliani argued that 
public debt is burden for next generations, as it reduces the flow of income due 
to lower stock of private capital and he also pointed out the non-linear impact of 
public debt to the interest rates. Meade had shown in his own research how 
removal of debt could increase economic growth due to increased incentives of 
households to work and save more and how this could possible lead to lower 
taxation, as less capital would be needed for interest payments, which in turn 
would increase growth as providing even more incentives to work and save 
more (Checherita & Rother, 2010: 9-10).  
 
Diamond studied the effect of public debt (external and internal) on economic 
growth and found that both types of public debt reduce the available 
consumption and savings and thus capital stock. He also found how internal 
debt can produce a further reduction in the capital stock as individuals 
substitute physical capital to government debt (Diamond, 1965: 1147). 
 
Paul Krugman coined the term “debt overhang” which describes a situation 
where country’s expected repayment ability falls below the contractual value of 
debt. In his research external debt accumulation can promote investment, while 
beyond certain point the debt overhang will decrease foreign capital inflow and 
thus capital accumulation and economic growth (Krugman, 1988: 29-31).  
 
Other channels through which public debt may have effect on economic growth 
are total factor productivity and increased uncertainty about future policy 
decisions, which may negatively affect investment decisions and thus growth. 
Private saving and public investments are also found to be affected by public 
debt and thus also affect economic growth. (Checherita & Rother, 2010: 11, 19). 
 
Some researchers also point out how the public or government debt can alter 
the political process that determines fiscal policy. They point that the possibility 
of government borrowing reduces the discipline of the budget process. “When 
additional government spending does not need to be matched by additional tax 
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revenue, policymakers and the public will generally worry less about whether 
the additional spending is appropriate” (Elmendorf  & Mankiw, 1998:20). 
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7. Previous research and research hypotheses 
 
 
7.1. Previously done research 
 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters redistribution is major reducing factor for 
inequality, and that public debt usually grows in downturns when taxes drop 
quicker than public spending. Those two are clearly linked, even if papers 
published regarding this issue can be counted on the fingers of one hand. 
Luckily they are not completely non-existent. Probably the first paper to study 
this relationship was by Salti (2014). In his paper Salti argues, and provides 
evidence for, that domestic debt and external debt are dissimilar regarding their 
effect on income inequality. This is straight due to the fact that majority of 
domestic debt held by private investors is heavily top skewed. Indeed Michl 
(1991: 358) found that the 5th quintile received almost 90% of all interest 
payments in US in 1982. The top one percent of households received over 40 % 
of all interest payments, while 1-3th quintile households in aggregate received 
less than 5 % of all interest payments. And since that year wealth inequality has 
only grown in terms of Gini coefficient, from 0,799 in 1983 to 0,871 in 2013. 
(Wolf, 2014: 50). While inequality is exaggerated in United States compared to 
average OECD country, the situation is similar in all countries.  
 
Salti (2014: 822) goes so far as to state: “…lead domestic debt to have more of a 
regressive effective on income distribution than external debt.” The data set 
Salti (2014) uses is broader in terms of countries included, but narrower in the 
years included compared to this paper, so this paper continues in the footsteps 
first taken by Salti.  
 
Ostry et al (2014: 15) provides similar empirical evidence regarding public debt 
and its effect on economic performance. This thesis continues in these footsteps. 
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7.2. Hypotheses 
 
Using a panel data set, this paper investigates the impact of debt composition on 
measures of income inequality (market and disposable income) and tests the 
hypothesis that domestic debt is more regressive than external debt. And uses 
the same panel data to investigate the combined effect of inequality and public 
debt to economic performance. 
 
H1: Domestic debt has more regressive effect on income inequality than 
external debt. 
 
H2: Domestic and external debt have negative effect on economic growth and 
disposable and market inequality have dissimilar effect on economic growth. 
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8. Empirical analysis of determinants of inequality 
 
This chapter includes the empirical part of this thesis. Based on the theories, 
empirical results and methods presented in previous chapters. The key objective 
of this chapter is to present a statistically significant evidence of the hypotheses 
presented in the previous chapter. 
 
8.1. Data 
 
For analysis this paper uses version 6.1 of Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) data, which is the most comprehensive dataset for 
income inequality available. It includes both disposable and market Gini 
coefficients. (Solt, 2016). Countries will be limited to OECD members8 for data 
quality and comparability reasons. Beside SWIID, this paper uses International 
Monetary Fun (IMF) data for public debt and gross domestic product growth 
statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis data for domestic share of public 
debt, OECD data for savings rate and World Bank data for foreign direct 
investments. Following the example set by Immervoll and Richardson (2011: 
40) Redistribution is calculated as the absolute difference between market and 
disposable Gini coefficients. These values are calculated for all countries and 
years, when both market and disposable Gini coefficients are available. External 
debt is calculated as the remaining part of public debt that is not domestic debt. 
External debt is calculated for all countries and years when both domestic debt 
and public debt as % of GDP is known. There were few cases where the external 
debt share as % of GDP turns to a negative share when those calculations are 
done. However as the IMF data for public debt is more comprehensive, those 
negative values are omitted from the data.  
 
Table 3 provides a definition of the variables, their sources and the labels used 
in the regression tables. Our sample contains data on 22 countries for the period 
                                                   
8 Due to data limitations and consistency reasons countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, United Kingdom and United States.  
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1980-2015. We end up with an unbalanced panel data set of 8313 observations. 
Table 3 provides summary of data used.  
 
Table 3. Variable definitions 
Variable Label Description Source 
Gini disposable Disposable income Gini coefficient SWIID 6.1 
Gini market Market income Gini coefficient SWIID 6.1 
Gini redistribution Absolute redistribution (calculated as 
absolute difference between market 
and disposable income Gini 
coefficient) 
Based on SWIID 6.1 
Domestic 
public debt 
domestic Domestic public debt as % of GDP Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis  
External 
public debt 
external External public debt as % of GDP 
(calculated as remaining share of 
public debt as % of GDP) 
International 
Monetary Fund 
(Total public debt) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
fdi Foreign direct investment, net 
outflows (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
Saving rate saving Net saving rate OECD 
GDP growth % growth GDP – Annual growth rates in 
percentage 
OECD 
1st quintile 
income share 
quintile1 Income share of the 1st quintile as % 
of total income. 
World Bank 
5th quintile 
income share 
quintile5 Income share of the 5st quintile as % 
of total income. 
World Bank, WID 
(France, Poland & 
USA) 
Consumption hh_cons Household final consumption 
expenditure, etc. (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
Consumption g_cons General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank 
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8.2 Methods used in this thesis 
 
This thesis uses regression analysis for this empirical part. We use similar 
regression model as used by Salti (2014: 828-829) for hypothesis H1 and similar 
regression model as used Ostry et al (2014: 15).  
 
 
8.3 Analysis and research results 
 
Empirical analysis done for this thesis was done using Stata14 software, which is 
commonly used for economic research and allows all necessary regressions and 
other analysis to be done efficiently. Data was combined and edited as panel 
data in MS Excel. Manual calculations (for redistribution and external debt) 
were done in MS Excel. 
 
 
8.4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this thesis. The 
number of observations varies quite strongly between different variables. 
Ranging from 239 for 1st quintile income share to 751 for household and 
government expenditures as % of GDP. All in all the panel data includes 792 
rows. 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
domestic 504 44,357 28,83377 2,34 202,46 
external 486 23,173 15,96554 0,18 124,21 
public  749 63,965 35,36022 9,68 249,11 
fdi 736 3,1547 6,88633 -18,92 72,012 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
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market 457 0,4701 0,54123 0,216 0,6156 
disposable 637 0,2931 0,46957 0,16725 0,4205 
redistribution 457 0,1745 0,52283 0,32 0,375 
saving 739 6,264 5,01017 -13,027 27,5837 
growth 744 2,1576 2,40064 -11,6149 10,7996 
quintile1 239 0,0806 0,012737 0,051 0,12 
quintile5 291 0,4256 0,06880 0,313 0,6204 
g_cons 751 20,0171 3,03868 12,725 27,935 
hh_cons 751 55,870 6,31204 38,363 70,772 
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Figure 5. Domestic debt as % of GDP, per country 
Figure 6. Disposable income Gini coefficient, per country 
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8.5. Hypothesis testing and regression analysis 
 
We start first with testing hypothesis H1: Domestic debt and external debt are 
dissimilar regarding their effect on income inequality. 
 
We run reduced form regressions of inequality on public debt composition and 
other controls, in the fixed effects form:  
 
(5) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!" = 𝛽!𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! + 𝛽!𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! + 𝛼! + 𝑢!" , 𝑡 = 1,2…,T. 
 
Where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!" is disposable income Gini coefficient for country i, and year 
t.  𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! is domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!!! is external share as 
% of GDP, 𝑎! is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect and 𝑢!" is the 
error term. We choose this model over random effects regression model after 
computing the Hausman test, of which results are seen below in figure 3. We 
compute this test for all columns (1-3) and find similar results. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Hausman test results for disposable income Gini coefficient 
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We find mixed results for hypothesis 1. Table 5 shows results of regressions of 
equation (5) with the disposable income Gini coefficient as 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!" , 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! as domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! as external debt as % 
of GDP, and different set of control variables Xit in each column. Column (1) 
depicts a fixed-effects regression of (1) with domestic and external debt as % of 
GDP. Both variables have statistically significant and negative effect on the 
disposable income Gini coefficient. Domestic has a mean of 44,35, so even 
having domestic debt at the mean level decreases disposable income Gini 
coefficient by 0,6. Effect is even stronger for external debt. However we fail to 
notice any supporting evidence for hypothesis H1. Both domestic- and external 
debt decreases disposable income Gini coefficient. So in column (2) we add 
foreign direct investments (fdi) as a control variable and find that the 
coefficients on the domestic- and external debt are hardly changed from column 
(1). Fdi increases disposable income Gini coefficient, as was discussed chapter 
5.3. However the effect is only significant at the p<0,1 level. In column (3) we 
add government expenditure as share of GDP (g_cons). The results are virtually 
unchanged from column (2) for domestic debt and fdi, but now external debt is 
no longer statistically significant. Government expenditure is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 4. Disposable income Gini coefficient regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Domestic dept/VA 
 
-0,000146 
(0,018)** 
-0,000141 
(0,022)** 
-0,000125 
(0,049)** 
External debt/VA 
 
-0,001931 
(0,012)** 
-0,00189 
(0,026)** 
-0,000150 
(0,100) 
FDI 
 
 0,002145 
(0,081)* 
0,000221 
(0,073)* 
Public 
expenditure/VA 
 
  -0,000747 
(0,283) 
_cons 0,30776 0,30653 0,32014 
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(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** 
Countries 22 22 22 
n 427 426 426 
R2 0,0268 0,0356 0,0384 
legend: * p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
 
For market income inequality we use random effects model as seen in equation 
(6).  
 
(6) 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡!" = 𝛽!𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! + 𝛽!𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! + 𝛼! + 𝑢!" , 𝑡 = 1,2…,T. 
 
Where 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡!" is market income Gini coefficient for country i, and year t.  𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! is domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! is external share as % 
of GDP, 𝑎! is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect and 𝑢!" is the error 
term. We choose this model over fixed effects regression model after doing the 
Hausman test, of which results are seen in figure 8. For this model we also make 
an assumption that the unobserved effect 𝑎!  is uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variable (equation 7 below). (Wooldridge, 2012: 492). 
 
(7) 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑥!"# ,𝛼! =  0, 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,𝑇; 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘.  
 
 
Figure 8. Hausman test results for market income Gini coefficient 
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In order to decide whether to use random effects regression over OLS-
regression we do Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test. For which results are 
seen in figure 9, and thus decide to use random effects model. We do this for all 
columns (4-6) and find similar results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 reports results of regressions of equation (6) with the market income 
Gini coefficient as 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡!", 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! as domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! as external debt as % of GDP, and different set of control variables 
Xit in each column. Column (4) depicts a random-effects regression of (1) with 
domestic and external debt as % of GDP. Only domestic debt has a statistically 
significant and positive effect on the market income Gini coefficient and thus 
supports the hypothesis H1. In column (5) we add foreign direct investments as 
variable and find positive, but not statistically significant result for it. Adding fdi 
changes outcome for domestic debt as well as it is no longer meaningful 
variable. In column (6) we include government expenditure as share of GDP 
(g_cons). Now both domestic and external debt are statistically significant and 
Figure 9. Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for market income 
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have positive effect on market income inequality as discussed in chapter 6. 
Government expenditure has significantly significant and negative effect on 
market income. Based on the results we find mixed results for hypothesis 1. 
Domestic and external debt seems to decrease disposable income inequality, but 
also on the other hand increase market income inequality.  
 
 
Table 5. Market income Gini coefficient regression results 
 (4) (5) (6) 
domestic 
 
0,000228 
(0,043)** 
0,000174 
(0,125) 
0,000266 
(0,021)** 
external 
 
-0,000006 
(0,970) 
0,000316 
(0,097)* 
0,000480 
(0,013)** 
fdi 
 
 0,000181 
(0,487) 
0,000176 
(0,490) 
g_cons 
 
  -0,004164 
(0,001)*** 
Countries 22 22 22 
n 296 295 295 
R2 0,0206 0,0244 0,0681 
legend: * p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
 
 
We then turn to test hypothesis H2: Domestic and external debt have negative 
effect on economic growth and disposable and market inequality have dissimilar 
effect on economic growth. 
 
We run reduced form regressions of inequality on public debt composition and 
other controls, in the fixed effects form:  
 
(8) 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!" = 𝛽!𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! + 𝛽!𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! + 𝛽!𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡!"! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"! +𝐷! + 𝛼! + 𝑢!" , 𝑡 = 1,2…,T, 
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where 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!" is GDP growth as percentage change from next to current year 
for country i, D is year t dummies, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! is domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"!  is external share as % of GDP, 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!!!  is the absolute 
difference between market income and disposable income Gini coefficients, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"!  is the disposable income Gini coefficient, 𝑎!  is the unobserved 
time-invariant individual effect and 𝑢!" is the error term. We choose this model 
over random effects regression model after computing the Hausman test, of 
which results are seen in figure 10.  
 
 
 
We find mixed results for hypothesis 2. Table 6 shows results of regressions of 
equation (8) with 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!" is GDP growth as percentage chance from previous 
year, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! as domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! as external debt 
as % of GDP, 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"!  is the absolute difference between market 
income and disposable income Gini coefficients, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"! is the disposable 
income Gini coefficient and different set of control variables Xit in each column. 
Column (7) depicts a fixed-effects regression of (1) with domestic and external 
Figure 10. Hausman test for GDP growth regression 
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debt as % of GDP and redistribution and disposable income Gini coefficients. 
Domestic debt is shown to have positive, but not statistically significant role. 
External debt on the other hand has significant and negative effect on economic 
growth. Redistribution is shown to be positive for growth and is statistically 
significant as is disposable income Gini coefficient, however the effect is only 
significant at p<0,1 level. So in column (8) we add income shares of quintile1 
and quintile5 and find that the coefficients on the domestic- and external debt 
have similar effect as seen in column (7). Income share from 1st quintile is 
positively related to economic growth, while 5th quintile income share does not 
explain anything. In column (9) we add household expenditure as share of GDP 
(hh_cons) and saving as percentage of GDP. Now neither domestic debt nor 
external debt is statistically significant anymore. Redistribution is still positively 
related to economic growth. Saving is highly significant and positive for 
economic growth, while household expenditure is neither. Overall the results 
are light and mixed. External debt seems to be a burden to economic growth, 
while domestic debt is not. Redistribution is positively linked to economic 
growth, but so is disposable income Gini coefficient. More research is needed 
for the relationships between income inequality, public debt and economic 
growth. 
 
Table 6. Economic growth regression results 
 (7) (8) (9) 
domestic 
 
-0,01376 
(0,230) 
-0,05825 
(0,130) 
0,28358 
(0,425) 
external 
 
-0,08116 
(0,000)*** 
-0,13182 
(0,000)*** 
-0,04434 
(0,122) 
redistribution 
 
13,6426 
(0,051)* 
32,0506 
(0,020)** 
24,3763 
(0,041)** 
disposable 
 
18,5736 
(0,093)* 
41,8058 
(0,214) 
41,354 
(0,155) 
quintile1  228,52 
(0,060)* 
85,4025 
(0,424) 
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quintile5  2,1311 
(0,935) 
-23,7319 
(0,318) 
saving   0,74318 
(0,000)*** 
hh_cons   0,31935 
(0,220) 
Countries 22 22 22 
n 292 155 155 
R2 0,1015 0,2154 0,4238 
legend: * p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
 
 
To test the robustness and in order to control for heteroscedasticity we use 
similar model as equation 8, but this time with lagged time variable (t+1 and 
t+2).  
 
(10) 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!"!! = 𝛽!𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! + 𝛽!𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"! +𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"! + 𝐷! + 𝛼! + 𝑢!" , 𝑡 = 1+1, 2+1…,T+1, 
 
(12) 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!"!! = 𝛽!𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! + 𝛽!𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"! +𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"! + 𝐷! + 𝛼! + 𝑢!", 𝑡 = 1+2, 2+2…,T+2, 
 
where 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!" is GDP growth as percentage change from next to current year 
for country i, D is year t dummies, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"! is domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"!  is external share as % of GDP, 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"!  is the absolute 
difference between market income and disposable income Gini coefficients, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"!  is the disposable income Gini coefficient, 𝑎!  is the unobserved 
time-invariant individual effect and 𝑢!" is the error term. We choose this model 
over random effects regression model after computing the Hausman test, of 
which results are seen in figure 10.  
 
72  
Here we find similar results as previously. Table 7 shows results of regressions 
of equation (10) with 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!"  is GDP growth as percentage chance from 
previous year, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"!  as domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"!  as 
external debt as % of GDP, 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"! is the absolute difference between 
market income and disposable income Gini coefficients, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"!  is the 
disposable income Gini coefficient and different set of control variables Xit in 
each column. External debt has a statistically highly significant negative effect 
on growth, while disposable income inequality has a positive effect. In other 
words the effect is similar as in non-lagged regressions, but still weak. Equation 
(11) adds income quintiles, which are found to be non statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 7. Economic growth regression results 
 (10) (11) 
domestic 
 
0,0109213 
(0,187) 
-0,02103 
(0,555) 
external 
 
-0,372172 
(0,01)*** 
 
-0,053514 
(0,045)** 
redistribution 
 
3,620262 
(0,460) 
-6,291776 
(0,565) 
disposable 
 
17,89967 
(0,030)** 
4,720661 
(0,849) 
quintile1  31,8315 
(0,726) 
quintile5  -14,14668 
(0,519) 
Countries 22 22 
n 293 155 
R2 0,5683 0,6094 
legend: * p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Here we find similar results as previously. Table 8 shows results of regressions 
of equation (10) with 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!"  is GDP growth as percentage chance from 
previous year, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐!"!  as domestic debt as % of GDP and 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙!"!  as 
external debt as % of GDP, 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"! is the absolute difference between 
market income and disposable income Gini coefficients, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!"!  is the 
disposable income Gini coefficient and different set of control variables Xit in 
each column. Debt is found to be statistically significant, but domestic and 
external have opposite effect. Whereas domestic debt is seen as growth 
enhancing, external debt is shown to have adverse effect on growth. Disposable 
income has similar effect as previously, statistically significant and positive 
effect. Equation (13) adds income quintiles, which are found to be non 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 8. Economic growth regression results 
 (12) (13) 
domestic 
 
0,0232794  
(0,003)*** 
0,0483676 
(0,195) 
external 
 
-0,0234264 
(0,022)** 
-0,087668 
(0,0742) 
redistribution 
 
-2,93569 
(0,528) 
 -18,28007 
(0,119) 
disposable 
 
13,8511 
(0,070)* 
11,33651 
(0,660) 
quintile1  2,424718 
(0,979) 
quintile5  6,670257 
(0,771) 
Countries 22 22 
n 287 152 
R2 0,6005 0,5963 
legend: * p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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9. Conclusions 
 
 
The purpose of this master thesis was to investigate the combined effect of 
public debt and income inequality to economic performance within OECD 
countries. This was done first by addressing the effect of public debt to income 
inequality (hypothesis 1). Here we found mixed results. While both domestic 
and external debt seemed to decrease the level of income inequality, as 
measured by disposable income Gini coefficient, the effect was stronger for 
external debt, as our hypothesis pointed in the first place. For market income 
the effect was opposite. Here external debt seemed to have a stronger and 
positive effect to market income as compared to domestic debt.  
 
Results regarding the combined effect of inequality and public debt to economic 
performance is also mixed (hypothesis 2). This thesis did not find evidence that 
domestic debt would be detrimental, while external debt on the other hand 
causes clear negative consequences. In similar fashion redistribution has 
positive effect to economic growth, which is against theory, but this thesis is not 
the first one to find this effect. (see chapter 5.8.). When using time-lagged 
models (t+1, t+2) we find somewhat contra dictionary results. Here 
redistribution is not statistically significant, while disposable income inequality 
is and it has positive effect on growth. External debt is seen in both models as a 
negative contributor to economic growth. 
 
The biggest contribution of this thesis is that it gives clear indication that using 
aggregate public debt is not sufficient, as the effect of external and domestic 
debt seem to vary. In similar terms income inequality should be studied 
between disposable- and market income Gini coefficients. It seems that too 
much market income inequality is harmful for growth. No wonder OECD and 
others recommend investments to education, as that is one of the biggest 
contributors to reduced market income inequality. However current levels of 
disposable income inequality in studied OECD countries are neutral to growth, 
or even too low for optimal (see tables 7 & 8).  
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9.1 Further research ideas 
 
 
The lack of data, even as this paper uses the most comprehensive data for 
income inequality available at the moment, causes difficulties and raises more 
questions than this paper can answer. And the inequality data is not the only 
problem, while public debt data is already at quite good level, the data for 
domestic and external share of it is still lacking. Given more comprehensive 
data a more thorough research could be done. Also this paper only focuses on 
limited set of OECD countries, so the effect of income inequality for less 
developed countries could be a good research idea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76  
10. References 
 
 
Acemoglu Daron and Restrepo Pascual (2018). Artificial Intelligence, 
Automation and Work. MIT Working Paper Series, 18-01. 
 
Alesina Alberto and Perotti Roberto (1994). The Politics of Growth: A Survey of 
the Recent Literature. World Bank Economic Review 8:351-374. 
 
Alvaredo Facundo, Chancel Lucas, Piketty Thomas, Saez Emmanuel, Zucman 
Gabriel (2017). World Inequality Report 2018. Cited 9.1.2018. 
Available on world wide web <URL: 
http://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-
english.pdf> 
 
Amronin Gene, De Nardi Mariacristina and Schulze Karl (2018). Inequality and 
recessions. Chigago Fed Letter, essays on issues, nro. 382. 
 
Aristotle (1995). Politics. (Ernest Barker, ed. and translator.) New York: Oxford 
University Press. ISBN-13:978-0-19-283393-8.  
 
Atkinson Anthony B (1970). On the measurement of Inequality. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 2, 244-263.  
 
Autor David, Dorn David, Katz Lawrence F., Patterson Christina and Van 
Reenen John (2017). The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of 
Superstar Firms. NBER Working Paper, No. 23396.  
 
Babu M. Suresh, Bhaskaran Vandana and Venkatesh Manasa (2016). Does 
inequality hamper long run growth? Evidence from Emerging 
economies. Economic Analysis and Policy, 52. pp. 99-113. 
 
77  
Bagchi Sutirtha and Svejnar Jan (2015). Does wealth inequality matter for 
growth? The effect of billionaire wealth, income distribution, and 
poverty. Journal of Comparative Economics, 43(3). pp. 505-530. 
 
Bank of International Settlements (2017). 87th Annual Report. Cited 10.1.2017. 
Available on world wide web: <URL: 
https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2017e.pdf> 
 
Baum Sandy (1992). “Poverty, Inequality, and the Role of Government: What 
Would Adam Smith Say?” Eastern Economic Journal, 18 (2): pp. 
143–56. 
 
Barro Robert J (1974). Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?. Journal of Political 
Economy. 82:6, 1095-1117. 
 
Bordo M D, Meisner Christopher and Redish Angela (2003). How “Original Sin” 
Was Overcome: The Evolution of External Debt Denominated in 
Domestic Currencies in United States and The British Dominions 
1800-2000. NBER Working Paper 9841. 
 
Bordo Michael D., Meissner Christopher M. and Stuckler David (2010). Foreign 
currency debt, financial crises and economic growth: A long-run 
view. Journal of International Money and Finance, 29:4. pp. 642-
665.  
 
Brennan Matthew P. (2017). Income Inequality: Not Your Usual Suspect in 
Understanding the Financial Crash and Great Recession. Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law, 18(1). pp. 97-110. 
 
Burda, Michael ja Wyplosz, Charles (2009). Macroeconomics: A European 
text.5th edition. New York. Oxford University Press Inc. ISBN 978-0-
19-923682-4.  
 
78  
Caminada Koen, Wang Jinxian, Goudswaard Kees, Wang Chen (2017). Income 
inequality and fiscal distribution in 47 LIS-countries, 1967-2014. LIS 
Working Paper Series, No. 724. 
 
Castelló-Climent Amparo (2010). Inequality and growth in advanced 
economies: an empirical investigation. Journal of Economic 
Inequality, 8. pp. 293-321. 
 
Cohen Luc and Rabouin Dion (2017). Argentina raises eyebrows with surprise 
100-year bond sale. Reuters. Cited 17.1.2018. Available on World 
Wide Web: <URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-
bonds/argentina-raises-eyebrows-with-surprise-100-year-bond-sale-
idUSL1N1JG17S> 
 
Chetty Raj, Grusky David, Hell Maximilian, Hendren Nathaniel, Manduca 
Robert & Narang Jimmy (2017). The Fading American dream: 
Trends in absolute income mobility since 1940. Science. Cited 
28.12.2017. Available on world wide web: <URL: 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2017/04/21/science.aa
l4617.full> 
 
Chetty Raj, Hendren Nathaniel, Kline Patrick, Saez Emmanuel and Turner 
Nicholas (2014). Is United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent 
Trends in Intergenerational Mobility. American Economic Review: 
Papers & Proceedings. 104(5): 141-147.  
 
Checherita Cristina & Rother Philipp (2010). The Impact of high and growing 
government debt on economic growth. An Empirical investigation for 
the euro area. [online] European Central Bank Working paper no 
1237. 
 
79  
Cingano Federico (2014). Trends in Income inequality and its impact on 
Economic Growth. OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Papers, No. 163. 
 
Dabla-Norris Era, Kochhar Kalpana, Suphaphiphat Nujin, Ricka Frantisek and 
Tsounta Evridiki (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income 
Inequality: A Global Perspective. International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
D'Alessandro Andres and Kraul Chris (2014). Argentina defaults on 
international debt, blames U.S. Los Angeles Times. Cited 17.1.2018. 
Available on World Wide Web: <URL: 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fg-argentina-defaults-20140731-
story.html> 
 
Deininger K and Squire L (1998). New Ways of Looking at Old Issues. Journal 
of Development Economics, 57. 259-87. 
 
De Loecker Jan and Eeckhout Jan (2017). The Rise of Market Power and the 
Macroeconomic Implications. NBER Working Paper, No. 23687. 
 
Elmendorf Douglas W & Mankiw N Gregory (1998). Government Debt. NBER 
Working paper 6470.  
 
Ferreira, Franciso H.G. (1999). Inequality and Economic Performance: A Brief 
Overview to Theories of Growth and Distribution. Text for World 
Bank’s Web Site on Inequality, Poverty, and Socio-economic 
Performance. Cited 3.1.2018. Available on World Wide Web: <URL: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.458.7810
&rep=rep1&type=pdf> 
 
Fleming Sam (2017, Nov 30). Yellen warns on public debt, productivity and 
inequality: Fed Chief. Financial Times. Print. 
80  
 
Forbes Kristin J. (2000). A Reassessment of the Relationship Between 
Inequality and Growth. The American Economic Review, 90(4). pp. 
869-887. 
 
Friedman Benjamin (2005). Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. 
Random House, Inc. New York, United States. ISBN: 978-1-4000-
9571-1. 
 
Friedman Milton (1991). Economic Freedom, Human Freedom, Political 
Freedom. Speech delivered at the Smith Center.  
 
Galbraith James K. (2007). Global inequality and global macroeconomics. 
Journal of Policy Modeling, 29 pp. 587-607. 
 
Gale William & Orszag Peter (2003). The Economic effects of Long-Term Fiscal 
Discipline. [online] Brookings Institution. [Cited 29.1.2013]. 
Available on World Wide Web: <URL: 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/58901/31066
9-The-Economic-Effects-of-Long-Term-Fiscal-Discipline.PDF > 
 
Glaeser Edward, Scheinkman Jose and Shleifer Andrei (2003). The Injustice of 
inequality. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(1). pp. 199-222. 
 
Guardian, The (2016). Donald Trump: 'I could shoot somebody and I wouldn’t 
lose any voters'. Cited 5.12.2017. Available on world wide web: 
<URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jan/24/donald-trump-says-he-could-shoot-somebody-
and-still-not-lose-voters> 
 
Hauner Thomas, Milanovic Branko and Naidu Suresh (2017). Inequality, 
Investment, and Imperialism. Stone Center Working Paper. Cited 
81  
17.1.2018. Available on world wide web: <URL: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089701> 
 
Halter Daniel, Oechslin Manuel and Zweimüller Josef (2014). Inequality and 
growth: the neglected time dimension. Journal of Economic Growth, 
19(1). pp. 81-104. 
 
Hobbes J. A. (2005). Imperialism: A Study. Cosimo, New York, United States. 
ISBN: 1-59605-948-6. 
 
Hont Istvan, and Ignatieff Michael. 1983. “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of 
Nations.” In Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy 
in the Scottish Enlightenment. ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1–44.  
 
Immervoll Herwig and Richardson Linda (2011). Redistribution policy and 
inequality reduction in OECD countries: What has changed in two 
decades? OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Papers, No. 122. 
 
Jaumotte Florence, Lall Subir and Papageorgiou Chris (2013). Rising Income 
Inequality: Technology, or Trade and Financial Globalization?. IMF 
Economic Review, 61(2). pp. 271-309.  
 
Jordà Òscar, Knoll Katharina, Kuvshinov Dmitry, Schularick Moritz and Taylor 
Alan M. (2017). The Rate of Return of Everything, 1870-2015. 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco Working Paper 2017-25. .  
 
Kaldor Nicholas (1955). Alternative theories of distribution. Review of 
Economic Studies, 23(2). pp. 83–100. 
 
82  
Kaldor Nicholas (1961). Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth in Theory 
of Capital, ed. F.A. Lutz And D.C. Hague. New York: St Martin’s 
Press. pp. 172-222. 
 
Karlin Paavo (2013). The cost of domestic and foreign public borrowing to 
economic performance. University of Vaasa, Finland. Unpublished. 
 
Kennedy Tom, Smyth Russell, Valadkhani Abbas and Chen George (2017). Does 
income inequality hinder economic growth? New evidence using 
Australian taxation statistics. Economic Modelling, 65. pp. 119-128. 
 
Kirschenmann Karolin, Malinen Tuomas and Nyberg Henri (2016). The risk of 
financial crises: Is there a role for income inequality? Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 68. pp. 161-180. 
 
Korinek Anton and Stiglitz Joseph E. (2017). Artificial Intelligence and Its 
Implications for Income Distribution and Unemployment. NBER 
Working Paper, No. 24174. 
 
Kremer M and Masking E. (2006). Globalization and inequality. Working 
Paper 2008-0087. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University.  
 
Krugman, Paul (1988). FINANCING VS.FORGIVING.A DEBT OVERHANG. 
NBER Working paper 2486. 
Kus Basak (2012). Financialisation and Income Inequality in OECD Nations: 
1995-2007. The Economic and Social Review, 43(4). pp. 477-495.  
 
Levy Frank and Temin Peter (2007). Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century 
America. MIT Working Paper Series, 07-17. 
 
83  
Neves Pedro Cunha, Afonso Óscar and Silva Sandra Tavaras (2016). A Meta-
Analytic Reassessment of the Effects of Inequality on Growth. World 
Development, vol 78. pp. 386-400. 
 
New Yorker, 2017. How Stalin become Stalinist. Cited 5.12.2017. Available on 
world wide web: 
<URL:https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/06/how-
stalin-became-stalinist> 
 
New York Times (2016). Today’s Inequality Could Easily Become Tomorrow’s 
Catastrophe. Robert J. Shiller. Cited 10.3.2017. Available on world 
wide web: 
<URL:https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/upshot/todays-
inequality-could-easily-become-tomorrows-catastrophe.html> 
 
New York Times (2017). Rachel Sherman. What the Rich Won’t Tell You. Cited 
4.1.2018. Available on world wide web: <URL: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/opinion/sunday/what-the-
rich-wont-tell-you.html?_r=0> 
 
Nino-Zarazúa Miguel, Roope Laurance and Tarp Finn (2017). Global inequality: 
Relatively lower, absolutely higher. Review of Income and Wealth, 
63(4). pp. 661-684. 
 
MacDonald James (2006). A Free Nation deep in debt: the financial roots of 
democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-
0691126326. 
 
Michl Thomas R. (1991). Debt, Deficits, and the Distribution of Income. Journal 
of Post Keynesian Economics, 13(3). pp. 351-365. 
 
McKinsey (2017). The New Dynamics of Financial Globalization. Edited by 
Bughin Jacques, Manyika James, Woetzel Jonathan. Cited 10.1.2018. 
84  
Available on world wide web: 
<URL:https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/F
inancial%20Services/Our%20Insights/The%20new%20dynamics%2
0of%20financial%20globalization/Financial%20globalization_Full%
20Report_August_29_2017%20(1).ashx> 
 
Meschi Elena and Vivarelli Marco (2007). Globalization and income inequality. 
IZA Discussion papers, 2958.  
 
Milanovic Branko (1997). A Simple way to calculate the Gini coefficient, and 
some implications. Economics Letters 56. pp. 45-49.  
 
Milanovic Branko (2011). More or Less: Income inequality has risen over the 
past quarter-century instead of failing as expected. IMF Finance & 
Development. September, 2011.  
 
Milanovic Branco, Lindert Peter H., Williamson Jeffrey G. (2011) Pre-industrial 
inequality. The Economic Journal, 121(551), pp. 255-272. 
 
Milanovic Branko (2016). Global Inequality. The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University. Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. ISBN 
9780674737136. 
 
Neuhourser, Frederick (2013). Rousseau’s Critique of Economic inequality. 
Philosophy & Public Affairs. 41, no. 3. 
 
OECD (2011). Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: 
Main Findings, from Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps 
Rising. pp. 21-45. 
 
OECD (2015a). Household wealth inequality across OECD countries: new OECD 
evidence. OECD Statistics Brief 2015, No. 21. Cited 11.1.2018. 
Available on world wide web: <URL: 
85  
https://www.oecd.org/std/household-wealth-inequality-across-
OECD-countries-OECDSB21.pdf> 
 
OECD (2015b). In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits Us All. Cited 
12.1.2018. Available on world wide web: <URL: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235120-en> 
 
OECD (2016a). OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD). Cited 5.1.2018. 
Available on world wide web: <URL: 
http://www.oecd.org/social/OECD2016-Inequality-Update-
Figures.xlsx> 
 
OECD (2018). General Government Debt. Cited 17.1.2018. Available on World 
Wide Web: <URL: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-
debt.htm> 
 
Ostry Jonathan D., Berg Andrew and Tsangarides Charalambos G. (2014). 
Redistribution, Inequality and Growth. IMF Staff Discussion Note. 
 
Panizzi Ugo (2007). Is Domestic Debt Answer to Debt Crises? Mimeo, 
UNCTAD. 
 
Pattillo, Catherine, Poirson, Hélène & Ricci, Luca (2004). What Are the 
Channels Through Which External Debt Affects Growth?. [online] 
IMF Working Paper 04/15. [Cited 29.1.2018] Available on World 
Wide Web: <URL: 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/teacher/oono/hp/docu01/paper06.pdf> 
 
Persson Torsten and Tabellini Guido (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?. 
The American Economic Review, 84(3). pp. 600-621. 
 
Piketty Thomas (2014). Capital in the 21st century. The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. 
86  
 
Piketty Thomas and Emmanuel Saez (2013). Income Inequality in the United 
States. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1). pp. 1-39.  
 
Piketty Thomas and Saez Emmanuel (2014). Inequality in the long run. Science, 
344 (6168), pp. 838-843. 
 
Plato (1951). The Republic. (Lindsay A. D., translator.) Dutton, New York. 
 
Salti Nisreen (2015). Income inequality and the composition of public debt. 
Journal of Economic Studies, 42(5). pp 821-837.  
 
Samuelson, Paul A & Nordhaus William D(1995). Economics. 15thedition. New 
York. McGraw-Hill, Inc. ISBN 0-07-054981-8. 
 
Scheidel Walter (2016). The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of 
inequality from the Stone Age to Twenty-First Century. Princeton 
University Press. Princeton, US. 444 pp. 
 
Solt Frederick (2016). The Standardized World Income Inequality Database. 
Social Science Quarterly 97. SWIID Version 6.1, October 2017. 
 
Smith Adam (1969) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by D.D. Raphael 
and A.L. Macfie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Smith Adam (1981). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd. 2 Vols. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.  
 
Solt Frederik (2008). Standardizing the world income inequality database. LIS 
Working Paper Series, No. 496.  
 
87  
Starmans Christina, Sheskin Mark and Bloom Paul (2017). Why people prefer 
unequal societies. Nature, Human Behaviour, 1, 0082, pp. 1-7.   
 
Ravallion M. and Chen S (1997), “What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about 
Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?”, World Bank 
Economic Review, 11(2). pp. 357-82. 
 
Rawls John (1972). A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press. London. 
ISBN 0674000781. OCLC 41266156. 
 
Reinhart Carmen M & Rogoff Kenneth S (2010). Growth in a Time of Debt. 
NBER Working paper 15639.  
 
Reinhart Carmen M. and Rogoff Kenneth S. (2011). The Forgotten History of 
Domestic Debt. The Economic Journal, 121(552). pp. 319-350. 
 
Wolff Edward N. (2014). Household wealth trends in the united states, 1962-
2013: What happened over the great recession?. NBER Working 
Paper 20733.  
 
Woolridge Jeffrey M (2012). Introductory Econometrics – A Modern 
Approach. 5th edition. Cengage, Mason, United States. ISBN-13: 978-
1-111-53104-1. 
 
Roine Jesper, Vlachos Jonas and Waldenström Daniel (2009). The long-run 
determinants of inequality: What can we learn from top income 
data?. INF Working Paper, no 721. 
 
Taleb Nassim Nicholas (2015). How to (Not) Estimate Gini Coefficients for Fat 
Tailed Variables. Tail Risk Working Paper Series.  
 
Tett Gillian (2018, January 13). Bridgewater billionaire Ray Dalio:”I have an 
affinity for mistakes”.  Financial Times. 13.1.2018. Print 
88  
 
Wang Chen and Caminada Koen (2011). Disentangling Income Inequality and 
the Redistributive Effect of Social Transfers and Taxes in 36 LIS 
Countries. Department of Economics Research Memorandum, 
2011(2). pp. 1-53. 
 
Wood Allen W. (2014). Marx on Equality. pp. 252-273. 
Doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685530.003.0011. 
 
Woolford, Michael (2011). Simple analytics of the government expenditure 
multiplier. American Economic Journal. Macroeconomics, 3:1, 1-35 
 
